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HERDING CATS: GOVERNING DISTRIBUTED
INNOVATION*
ALBERT C. LIN**
Do-It-Yourself biology, 3D printing, and the sharing economy
are equipping ordinary people with new powers to shape their
biological, physical, and social environments. This phenomenon
of distributed innovation is yielding new goods and services,
greater economic productivity, and new opportunities for
fulfillment.
Distributed
innovation
also
brings
new
environmental, health, and security risks that demand oversight,
yet conventional government regulation may be poorly suited to
address these risks. Dispersed and dynamic, distributed
innovation requires the development of more flexible tools for
oversight and government collaboration with private partners in
governance.
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INTRODUCTION
Various technological advances are equipping ordinary people
with new powers to shape their biological, physical, and social
environments. Do-It-Yourself biology (“DIYbio”) offers amateur
biotechnologists the chance to design new organisms. 3D printing
enables individuals to design and manufacture a confounding array of
objects. The sharing economy—and the technological changes behind
it—facilitate constant innovation in providing goods, services, and
information outside of traditional managerial hierarchies. On top of
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these advances, the internet enables rapid and widespread diffusion
of each of these technologies. DIYbio, 3D printing, and the sharing
economy are examples of “distributed technologies”: technologies in
which a wide range of users may participate in the innovation process.
Distributed technologies are transforming how we live and interact,
dispersing the innovation process, and giving individuals the power to
invent, produce, and disseminate.
The resulting changes can give rise to new products and services
and new means of production. They may also offer environmental
benefits by increasing efficiency or reducing waste. At the same time,
distributed-innovation activities can generate new risks of chemical
exposure or environmental release. Distributed-innovation activities
may also circumvent legal protections or involve deliberate misuse.
Normally, command-and-control regulation, market-based
mechanisms, or other regulatory techniques could be applied to
manage health and environmental risks. Distributed-innovation
practices, however, often lie outside the ambit of these methods as
currently deployed. In many instances it will be difficult, if not
impossible, to apply conventional risk management to distributedinnovation activities because of their dispersed and dynamic nature.
Such difficulty raises questions regarding government’s ability to
modify its methods or adopt new regulatory approaches in response.
Society may need to look beyond regulation for tools to help manage
risks.
Scholarship that considers environmentally harmful individual
behavior provides a useful starting point for thinking about how to
manage the risks of distributed innovation. Tactics to influence
individual behavior, however, may not apply directly to distributed
innovation. Distributed innovation involves extremely rapid change,
unpredictable systems, and highly uncertain effects. This Article
explains how distributed innovation poses an increasingly important
challenge for regulators and then identifies potential mechanisms for
managing its risks.
Part I of the Article introduces three examples of distributed
innovation—DIYbio, 3D printing, and the sharing economy—and
describes associated concerns that may warrant oversight. While these
examples build on different technological advances, they are all
characterized by decentralized problem solving, participation by
dispersed actors, and dynamic change. Part II explores the challenges
that distributed innovation poses for conventional regulatory
techniques. Distributed innovation looks quite different from the
concentrated industrial or commercial activities typically governed by
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the regulatory state. For insights into responding to the challenges
posed by distributed innovation, Part III turns to prior and existing
efforts to address environmental harms resulting from small-scale or
individual behavior. Building on these insights, Part IV returns to the
challenges posed by distributed innovation and suggests a paradigm
for organizing options for governance. Specifically, distributedinnovation governance might take one of three general approaches:
(1) a “Big Data/Big Government” approach; (2) an approach that
relies heavily on nongovernmental intermediaries for oversight; and
(3) a self-regulatory approach. Yet no single approach offers a
complete response to distributed innovation’s risks. Part V explores
how society might apply these various approaches to DIYbio, 3D
printing, and the sharing economy. Ultimately, each approach may
have a distinct role to play in the governance of different fields of
distributed innovation.
I. THREE EXAMPLES OF DISTRIBUTED INNOVATION
Distributed innovation describes processes in which “users of
products and services—both firms and individual consumers—are
increasingly able to innovate for themselves.”1 Such a system is
“characterized by decentralized problem solving, self-selected
participation, self-organizing coordination and collaboration, ‘free’
revealing of knowledge, and hybrid organizational models that blend
community with commercial success.”2 Several of distributed
innovation’s features—decentralization, wide dissemination, and
collaborative work—promise to spur creativity and bring about
transformative change. At the same time, distributed innovation
breaks with conventional models of economic activity and
assumptions regarding risk generation, raising new challenges for
regulators. This Part considers three examples of distributed
innovation: DIYbio, 3D printing, and the sharing economy. In each

1. ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION 1 (2005) (describing
distributed innovation as innovation that is “democratized”). Jennifer Snow uses a similar
term, “Radical Leveling Technology,” to refer to disruptive technologies that can be
diffused over the internet and require minimal infrastructure or investment. Jennifer J.
Snow, Entering the Matrix: The Challenge of Regulating Radical Leveling Technologies,
at 3 (Dec. 2015) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Naval Postgraduate School),
http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/47874/15Dec_Snow_Jennifer.pdf?sequence=3
&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/US6G-A6SU].
2. Karim R. Lakhani & Jill A. Panetta, The Principles of Distributed Innovation, 2
INNOVATIONS: TECH., GOVERNANCE, GLOBALIZATION 97, 98 (2007).
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instance, diminishing entry barriers to cutting-edge technologies have
enabled more and more people to engage in the innovation process.3
A. DIYbio
DIYbio refers to biotechnology research conducted by scientists
and non-scientists outside of traditional academic and industrial
institutions.4 This research is often aimed at encouraging
collaboration and experimentation without specialists providing
direct assistance.5 DIYbio experiments might take place in
community labs (dedicated labs with pooled resources where people
collaborate on science projects) or private homes.6 Setting up a
DIYbio lab in one’s garage might cost a few thousand dollars, or less
if one uses secondhand or improvised equipment.7 Community labs,
an increasingly popular DIYbio venue, offer classes, sharing of
expertise, and access to more powerful equipment at a lower per
capita cost.8 The shrinking of economic, institutional, and educational
barriers to entry has broadened participation in biotechnology
research, a realm that previously required technical expertise and
expensive equipment.9 The core premise of DIYbio, consistent with
the citizen science movement of which it is a part, is that amateurs
should enjoy the freedom to learn basic biotechnology techniques and

3. See Andrew D. Maynard, Why We Need Risk Innovation, 10 NATURE
NANOTECHNOLOGY 730, 730–31 (2015).
4. See DANIEL GRUSHKIN, TODD KUIKEN & PIERS MILLET, WILSON CTR., SEVEN
MYTHS & REALITIES ABOUT DO-IT-YOURSELF BIOLOGY 4 (2013). This Article uses the
term “DIYbio” to refer generally to biotechnology research conducted outside of
traditional academic and industrial institutions. DIYbio.org is the largest organization
engaged in such activity. Catherine Jefferson, The Growth of Amateur Biology: A Dual
Use Governance Challenge? 3 (Biochemical Security 2030 Project, Policy Paper 3, 2013),
https://biochemsec2030dotorg.files.wordpress.com/2013/08/jefferson-policy-paper-3-for-print.pdf
[https://perma.cc/457D-TN5J]; see also An Institution for the Do-It-Yourself Biologist,
DIYBIO, https://diybio.org/ [https://perma.cc/A9C4-WSX4].
5. Thomas Landrain et al., Do-It-Yourself Biology: Challenges and Promises for an
Open Science and Technology Movement, 7 SYST. SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 115, 116 (2013).
6. GRUSHKIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 5.
7. See Heidi Ledford, Life Hackers, 467 NATURE 650, 651 (2010).
8. See id.; see also GRUSHKIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 5, 9 (reporting survey results
finding that most DIYbio practitioners work in group spaces and that just eight percent of
“respondents[] work[ed] exclusively in home labs”); Ellen Jorgensen, Opinion, How DIY
Bio-Hackers Are Changing the Conversation Around Genetic Engineering, WASH. POST
(May 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2016/05/20/how-diybio-hackers-are-changing-the-conversation-around-genetic-engineering/ [https://perma.cc
/WM6H-37MK (dark archive)] (reporting the existence of nearly thirty community labs).
9. See Sarah Kellogg, The Rise of DIY Scientists: Is It Time for Regulation?, WASH.
LAW, May 2012, at 21, 22.
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then use those techniques to experiment, tinker with DNA, and
develop new organisms.10
DIYbio capitalizes on the rapidly advancing techniques of
synthetic biology, which aims to design novel genetic sequences and
biological systems. In contrast to conventional genetic engineering,
which transplants existing genes for a desired trait from one species
into the genome of another species, synthetic biology involves the
writing of new genetic sequences and potentially the creation of new
species.11 Drawing on the tools and methodologies of molecular
biology, computer engineering, mathematics, and other disciplines,
synthetic biologists view genetic sequences as combinable and
reusable parts that can be assembled to create new functionalities or
new organisms.12 Although DNA sequencing and synthesizing
technologies have advanced rapidly in recent years, synthetic
biologists still face difficult challenges in understanding what different
genetic sequences do and how they will act when put together.13
Nonetheless, synthetic biologists are proving increasingly adept at
generating clusters of genes that can be inserted into existing species
using conventional techniques.14 Moreover, the discovery of new tools
is enabling faster and more accurate gene manipulation. CRISPRCas9, a recently developed gene-editing technique, has sparked
especially strong interest because of its speed, efficiency, and low
cost.15
10. See GRUSHKIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 4.
11. Josie Garthwaite, Beyond GMOs: The Rise of Synthetic Biology, ATLANTIC (Sept.
25, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/09/beyond-gmos-the-rise-of
-synthetic-biology/380770/ [https://perma.cc/P8EL-XK9Y].
12. See Roberta Kwok, Five Hard Truths for Synthetic Biology, 463 NATURE 288, 288
(2010).
13. See id. at 288–89; see also Catherine Jefferson, Filippa Lentzos & Claire Marris,
Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity: Challenging the “Myths,” FRONTIERS PUB. HEALTH,
Aug. 21, 2014, at 1, 8 https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpubh.2014.00115/full
[perma.cc/VS4P-3K6U] (discussing challenges involved in assembling gene-length
fragments and producing desired gene expression).
14. Garthwaite, supra note 11.
15. See Heidi Ledford, Biohackers Gear Up for Genome Editing, 524 NATURE 398,
398 (2015) [hereinafter Ledford, Biohackers] (reporting biohacker’s characterization of
CRISPR as “the most amazing tool ever”); see also Henry T. Greely, Take Care!, in
Patrick Skerrett, Is Do-It-Yourself CRISPR as Scary as it Sounds?, STAT (Mar. 14, 2016),
https://www.statnews.com/2016/03/14/crispr-do-it-yourself/ [https://perma.cc/U8WF-ATJR]
(contending that “CRISPR is revolutionizing genetics” and that “[i]n theory, anyone can
use CRISPR to modify the genes of any living organism”); Ellen Jorgensen, DIY
Community Can Do Interesting, Useful, Perfectly Respectable Things with CRISPR, in
Skerrett, supra (describing intense interest in CRISPR within the DIYbio community,
including among bioentrepreneurs and artists). See generally Heidi Ledford, CRISPR, the
Disruptor, 522 NATURE 20 (2015) (“CRISPR is causing a major upheaval in biomedical

96 N.C. L. REV. 945 (2018)

2018]

HERDING CATS

951

For DIYbio, the tools, standardization, and modularization of
synthetic biology allow a wide range of non-experts to participate in
biotechnological innovation.16 Many DIY biologists engage in
rudimentary experiments that pose little risk or groundbreaking
potential, and they often must develop specialized skills and
knowledge to overcome technical difficulties.17 Nevertheless, their
capabilities are improving, and the activities of do-it-yourselfers
cannot be ignored in light of the technology’s increasing power and
accessibility.
Practitioners of DIYbio sometimes label themselves
“biohackers,” drawing comparisons to the Silicon Valley hobbyists
and inventors who initiated the digital revolution in the 1970s.18 Like
their Silicon Valley counterparts, many DIY biologists believe their
efforts could lead to new insights and breakthroughs.19 Other DIY
biologists approach genetic manipulation as a way to produce art.20
Like the open-source software movement, DIYbio emphasizes
transparency and relies on the open exchange of information,
materials, and publications.21 The application of crowdfunding
techniques to DIYbio further amplifies the potential spread of
DIYbio activity.22
research. Unlike other gene-editing methods, it is cheap, quick and easy to use, and it has
swept through labs around the world as a result.”).
16. See Todd Kuiken, Learn from DIY Biologists, 531 NATURE 167, 167 (2016)
(noting how high school students and users of community labs participating in the 2015
International Genetically Engineered Machine competition used “[starting] kits
contain[ing] more than 1,000 standard biological parts . . . need[ed] to engineer a biological
system”); Landrain et al., supra note 5, at 116 (“As these promising biological technologies
become easier to manipulate, achievements, such as plasmid refactoring, that were once
only possible in leading laboratories are becoming routine for undergraduates, high school
students, and even amateur biologists (that is, biologists who practice science as a ‘hobby’,
usually outside of scientific institutions).”).
17. Jefferson et al., supra note 13, at 3–5; see also ALESSANDRO DELFANTI,
BIOHACKERS: THE POLITICS OF OPEN SCIENCE 115 (2013); Ledford, Biohackers, supra
note 15, at 399; Jefferson, supra note 4, at 4.
18. See Ledford, supra note 7, at 650–51. For more examples of biohackers and their
goals, see Seth Bannon, Biotech in the Garage, CLIMB HIGHER (July 6, 2015),
http://sethbannon.com/biotech-in-the-garage [https://perma.cc/4KXP-FHWC] and Marcus
Wohlsen, Cow Milk Without the Cow Is Coming to Change Food Forever, WIRED (Apr.
15, 2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/04/diy-biotech-vegan-cheese/ [https://perma.cc/ND4QBUV3].
19. See Landrain et al., supra note 5, at 118.
20. See R. Alta Charo & Henry T. Greely, CRISPR Critters and CRISPR Cracks, 15
AM. J. BIOETHICS 11, 13 (2015) (noting that “[b]ioart” already exists and speculating on
efforts to produce “dwarf elephants, giant guinea pigs, or genetically tamed tigers”).
21. GRUSHKIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 8; Ledford, supra note 7, at 651.
22. See Kuiken, supra note 16, at 168 (noting that synthetic biologist Josiah Zayner
raised over $62,000 online to fund the production and distribution of DIY CRISPR kits).
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In one of the best-known DIYbio projects to date, three
hobbyists created a bioluminescent plant and formed Glowing Plant,
Inc., a start-up company, to promote it.23 Glowing Plant raised nearly
half a million dollars through a crowdfunding campaign that promised
seeds of the genetically altered plant to financial supporters.24 The
fact that the plant is related to a weed led to concerns that unhindered
dissemination could lead to the exchange of genes with wild relatives
and ecological disruption.25 Yet no mechanism for regulatory
oversight appeared applicable, as the federal agency responsible for
regulating plant pests concluded that it lacked regulatory jurisdiction
over the plant.26 The Glowing Plant incident may be a harbinger of
things to come. In the future, CRISPR-Cas9 and other gene
manipulation techniques could allow individuals to rapidly alter the
genomes of mosquitoes, weeds, or other organisms—whether
deliberately or not.27
DIYbio raises non-ecological concerns as well. In the lab, DIY
biologists may fail to heed basic safety precautions that trained
scientists routinely follow and may suffer hazardous chemical
exposures.28 Moreover, using gene sequences ordered online, DIYbio
practitioners could reconstruct the DNA of harmful viruses and
microorganisms, a possibility that attracted the FBI’s attention.29
However, assurances from biotechnology experts that “mere
knowledge of a viral genome is far from sufficient to be able to reconstitute it or to create a disease-forming pathogen” eased initial
fears that bioterrorism could arise from DIYbio activity.30 DIYbio
23. Beth Baker, DIYbio—Alternative Career Path for Biologists?, 65 BIOSCIENCE
112, 112 (2015); Lisa M. Krieger, Bay Area: Tech Business’ Project About Much More than
Glowing Plant, MERCURY NEWS (Aug. 18, 2013), http://www.mercurynews.com/ci
_23889241/gene-engineers-popular-glow-dark-plant-tests-less [https://perma.cc/YY9T-PRYQ].
24. Krieger, supra note 23. The company, since renamed Taxa Biotechnologies, Inc.,
has yet to produce a plant that produces much glow or to ship any seeds to backers. See
Antonio Regalado, Why Kickstarter’s Glowing Plant Left Backers in the Dark, MIT TECH.
REV. (July 15, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601884/why-kickstartersglowing-plant-left-backers-in-the-dark/ [https://perma.cc/4YZQ-EWCN].
25. Krieger, supra note 23.
26. LYNN L. BERGESON ET AL., WILSON CTR., THE DNA OF THE U.S.
REGULATORY SYSTEM: ARE WE GETTING IT RIGHT FOR SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY? 45–46
(2015) (reporting the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service’s conclusion that it
lacked jurisdiction because the engineered plants involve no plant pests).
27. Greely, supra note 15.
28. See Dustin T. Holloway, Regulating Amateurs, SCIENTIST, March 2013, 27, 28.
29. Ledford, supra note 7, at 651–52.
30. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, NEW
DIRECTIONS: THE ETHICS OF SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 72
(2010) (noting that one must also have an appropriate host and conditions for a virus to
grow); see also GRUSHKIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 10 (reporting survey results finding that
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presently poses a minimal bioterrorism threat, as terrorists have other
available weapons that are proven, more readily available, and easier
to deploy.31 Moreover, most DIY biologists “work in community
spaces that require BSL-1 lab conditions,”32 which means that
experiments involve “well-characterized agents not known to
consistently cause disease in immunocompetent adult humans, and
present minimal potential hazard to laboratory personnel and the
environment.”33 Nonetheless, the FBI has maintained a
“neighborhood watch” approach that “relies on biohackers
monitoring their own community and reporting behaviour they find
threatening.”34
B.

3D Printing

3D printing, also known as additive manufacturing,35 offers
another instance of distributed innovation that warrants society’s
attention. Working from computer design files, 3D printing
manufactures three-dimensional objects by building up or binding
multiple thin layers of plastics, metals, or other materials.36 3D
printing’s ability to produce complex items in one piece offers
advantages in terms of structural integrity, weight, and waste
reduction.37
3D-printing technology itself is not new, as engineers have used
it for decades to create prototypes.38 In recent years, advances in
computing power, software, and materials have broadly expanded its
use by small businesses, entrepreneurs, and hobbyists.39 3D printing
now enables ordinary people to create complex custom objects more

most DIY biologists are “still learning basic biotechnology” and work with low-risk
organisms).
31. See Filippa Lentzos, Don’t Single Out the DIY Community, in Skerrett, supra note
15.
32. See GRUSHKIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 15.
33. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, BIOSAFETY IN
MICROBIOLOGICAL AND BIOMEDICAL LABORATORIES 30 (5th ed. 2009).
34. Ledford, supra note 7, at 652; see also Sara Tocchetti & Sara Angeli Aguiton, Is an
FBI Agent a DIY Biologist Like Any Other? A Cultural Analysis of a Biosecurity Risk, 40
SCI., TECH., & HUM. VALUES 825, 829 (2015) (discussing the formation of a working
relationship between the FBI and the DIYbio community).
35. HOD LIPSON & MELBA KURMAN, FABRICATED: THE NEW WORLD OF 3D
PRINTING 65 (2013).
36. See id. at 65–84; Lucas Osborn, Regulating Three-Dimensional Printing: The
Converging Worlds of Bits and Atoms, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 553, 558–59 (2014).
37. See Snow, supra note 1, at 20.
38. Robert Olson, A Boon or a Bane?, ENVTL. F., Nov./Dec. 2013, at 34, 35.
39. See LIPSON & KURMAN, supra note 35, at 11.
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quickly, cheaply, and skillfully than was previously possible.40
Individuals can purchase their own 3D printers, access a 3D printer in
a communal workspace, or use online services to print objects.41 A
wide range of objects can be printed, including guns, food, body parts,
and living tissue.42 Perhaps the most significant constraints on 3D
printing today are its slow speed—which is dictated in part by the
time it takes for material to harden—and its inability to print with
materials that have dissimilar melting points.43
Like DIYbio, 3D printing enables individuals to engage in
innovative activities that, because of their cost and complexity, were
previously limited to institutional actors.44 Both DIYbio and 3D
printing are subcategories of the maker movement, which refers to a
broad range of inventors, designers, and tinkerers who are engaged in
making things themselves, whether for fun or profit.45 Used by many
maker enthusiasts, 3D printing is a “broad platform technology” that
could change manufacturing practices, facilitate technological
breakthroughs, and transform society.46
3D printing may raise several concerns for policymakers,
however. First, the 3D-printing process can have adverse health or
environmental effects. 3D printing may involve the use of toxic or
explosive substances.47 Operating 3D printers may lead to chemical
respiratory exposures comparable to indoor smoking, causing
headaches, nausea, and severe skin and eye irritation.48 In commercial
40. See id. at 20–24, 30–33.
41. See John Schryber & Farah Tabibkhoei, Insurance Issues, in REED SMITH, 3D
PRINTING OF MEDICAL DEVICES 22, 22 (Colleen Davies et al. eds., 2015),
https://www.reedsmith.com/files/Publication/130448b9-7565-4295-a697-5c5d7c6eb516
/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/9ba9b53c-2009-488d-ba91-5cc5a19a38f7/3d-printingwhite-paper_79444049.pdf [https://perma.cc/9T3D-C7G8] (discussing the accessibility of
3D printers).
42. See Osborn, supra note 36, at 561; Olson, supra note 38, at 34–35, 38; see also Lisa
Baird & Matthew Jacobson, 3D Printing and Its Impact on Medical Device and Health
Care, in 3D PRINTING OF MEDICAL DEVICES, supra note 41, at 4, 4–5 (discussing medical
applications).
43. See Olson, supra note 38, at 35.
44. See id. at 34, 38 (noting how DIY biologists could use 3D printers to print their
own living tissue or bacteria).
45. See Tim Bajarin, Why the Maker Movement Is Important to America’s Future,
TIME (May 19, 2014), http://time.com/104210/maker-faire-maker-movement/ [http://perma.cc
/6Y7Y-AMBU].
46. LIPSON & KURMAN, supra note 35, at 50; see also Bajarin, supra note 45; Doug
Gross, Obama’s Speech Highlights Rise of 3-D Printing, CNN (Feb. 13, 2013),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/13/tech/innovation/obama-3d-printing/ [https://perma.cc/KXE8YD3T].
47. See Osborn, supra note 36, at 564; Olson, supra note 38, at 37.
48. See Olson, supra note 38, at 37.
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facilities, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”)
regulations could limit worker exposures and reduce combustion risks
by mandating protective equipment and practices.49 In other
environments, however, students or hobbyists engaged in 3D printing
may be less familiar with potential hazards and less apt to adopt
appropriate precautionary measures. Furthermore, while 3D printing
is sometimes hailed as a means of reducing manufacturing waste and
the need to transport goods long distances,50 the overall
environmental impact of 3D printing will depend on particular
machines and materials, as well as on patterns of use.51
Second, 3D-printed products may warrant even greater
regulatory attention. Toys and other everyday products are normally
subject to industry standards and some consumer-protection
requirements, however minimal.52 Objects produced by 3D printing,
in contrast, might escape conventional regulatory channels as a result
of their origin or small-scale manufacture. Furthermore, 3D printing
could be used for nefarious purposes: one might print counterfeit
machinery parts designed to break, potentially causing catastrophic
consequences.53 Terrorists might print biological weapons, chemical
weapons, or drones designed to deliver explosives or other deadly
payloads.54 3D printing also may be used to manufacture closely

49. Id. at 38. Compliance with OSHA regulations may be another matter entirely,
however. See id.; see also Todd Maiden & Farah Tabibkhoei, Environmental Effects and
Health Risks in the Workplace, in 3D PRINTING OF MEDICAL DEVICES, supra note 41, at
20, 20–21 (recounting OSHA citation issued to 3D-printing company for various violations
of workplace safety standards).
50. See Osborn, supra note 36, at 564–65.
51. See Olson, supra note 38, at 36–38.
52. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (2012) (authorizing promulgation of consumer
product safety standards); § 2056b (establishing mandatory toy safety standards). The
Consumer Product Safety Commission’s effectiveness has been widely questioned. See,
e.g., Russell T. Gips, Comment, From China with Lead: The Hasty Reform of the
Consumer Product Safety Commission, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 545, 547–48, 555–56 (2009)
(noting widespread criticism of the Commission).
53. See Peter Jensen-Haxel, 3D Printers, Physical Viruses, and the Regulation of
Cloud Supercomputing in the Era of Limitless Design, 17 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 737,
767–68 (2016) (discussing how hackers will attack various weak links in the computeraided design process at the heart of 3D printing); Kathy Wren, Realizing the Full Benefits
of 3D Printing Will Require Openness, Experts Say, AAAS NEWS (Oct. 25, 2013),
http://www.aaas.org/news/realizing-full-benefits-3d-printing-will-require-openness-experts
-say [https://perma.cc/6PD9-SMTE].
54. See Emerging Technologies: Lowering the Threshold for ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria) Mass Casualty Terrorism, BIOLOGICAL WARFARE BLOG: BLACK SIX (July 31,
2015, 2:41 AM), http://bio-defencewarfareanalyst.blogspot.com/2015/07 [https://perma.cc
/44DN-CU8J (dark archive)]; Roxanne Palmer, 3D Printing Risks: Not Just Plastic Guns,
but Military Parts, Drugs and Chemical Weapons, INT’L BUS. TIMES (May 24, 2013),
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regulated items such as weapons55 or custom-designed drugs.56
Although plastic 3D-printed guns are subject to overheating and
cracking after a few uses, such guns are difficult for security
equipment to detect, can be shaped in unrecognizable forms, and
could be particularly appealing to hobbyists and teenagers.57 In
addition, the quality and capabilities of printed guns are rapidly
improving.58 Fear that 3D printing would lead to the proliferation of
plastic guns has led to proposals to limit or ban their production.59
The United States Department of State has attempted to curb the
online publication of digital gun files, contending that such
publication could violate the International Trade in Arms
regulations.60 The ease of copying and sharing electronic files,
however, may make these efforts futile.61
Third, by facilitating the counterfeiting of objects, 3D printing
also has the potential to undermine intellectual property protections
and confound the identification of persons responsible for intellectual
property violations.62 Indeed, as consumers engage more widely in
http://www.ibtimes.com/3d-printing-risks-not-just-plastic-guns-military-parts-drugs-chemicalweapons-1275591 [http://perma.cc/BLM8-WCUF].
55. Wren, supra note 53 (citing examples of 3D-printed guns and “keys that can open
high-security locks”); see also Snow, supra note 1, at 32 (discussing potential use of 3D
printing to produce nuclear weapons components).
56. LIPSON & KURMAN, supra note 35, at 220–21; Snow, supra note 1, at 1.
57. Nick Bilton, The Rise of 3-D Printed Guns, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2014, at E2.
Various gun control measures, including registration and marking requirements, could
readily be circumvented by printing plastic guns. DANIEL CASTRO, INFO. TECH. &
INNOVATION FOUND., SHOULD GOVERNMENT REGULATE ILLICIT USES OF 3D
PRINTING? 3 (2013), http://www2.itif.org/2013-regulate-illicit-3d-printing.pdf [https://perma.cc
/RRP5-Q765].
58. Adam Clark Estes, 3D-Printed Guns Are Only Getting Better, and Scarier,
GIZMODO (Jan. 6, 2015), http://gizmodo.com/3d-printed-guns-are-only-getting-better-andscarier-1677747439 [http://perma.cc/2QZS-TCTK]; see Rob Walker, A Crypto-Anarchist
Will Help You Build a DIY AR-15, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 22, 2016),
https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-cody-wilson-ghost-gunner-ar-15/ [http://perma.cc
/G6HW-2PVG].
59. See, e.g., Undetectable Firearms Modernization Act of 2015, H.R. 2699, 114th
Cong. § 2 (2015). The Undetectable Firearms Act prohibits the manufacture, distribution,
or possession of guns that cannot be detected by a metal detector. 18 U.S.C. § 922(p)(1)–
(6) (2012).
60. Andy Greenberg, Feds Tighten Restrictions on 3-D Printed Gun Files Online,
WIRED (June 11, 2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/06/feds-restrict-3d-printed-gun-files/
[http://perma.cc/MB4C-WHJA].
61. See CASTRO, supra note 57, at 2.
62. See Deven R. Desai & Gerard N. Magliocca, Patents, Meet Napster: 3D Printing
and the Digitization of Things, 102 GEO. L.J. 1691, 1703 (2014) (contending that “3D
printing brings the problems of digitization to patents for the first time”); see also id. at
1713–14 (recommending that Congress create a patent infringement exception for
personal 3D printing and notice-and-takedown rules for sites that host 3D-printing
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copying and creating, 3D printing may weaken some of the rationales
that underlie existing intellectual property regimes.63
C.

The Sharing Economy

Finally, consider one other example of distributed innovation:
the sharing economy. Distributed innovation in this context involves
not only the sharing economy itself but also the proliferation of digital
platforms that enable sharing-economy activities. Though there is no
agreed-upon definition of the sharing economy, the term generally
refers to a wide range of activities “in which assets or services are
shared between private individuals, either free or for a fee, typically
by means of the Internet.”64 At the heart of the sharing economy are
digital-platform technologies that enable more intensive use of
resources, whether in the form of housing stock, motor vehicles, or
human labor. These platform technologies lower transaction costs and
facilitate nearly instantaneous exchanges, often bypassing traditional
businesses in favor of peer-to-peer transactions.65
software); Timothy R. Holbrook & Lucas S. Osborn, Digital Patent Infringement in an Era
of 3D Printing, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1319, 1325 (2015) (proposing theory of “digital
patent infringement” in which creation of digital files that can directly print objects might
infringe a patent claim relating to the underlying physical object). See generally Tabrez Y.
Ebrahim, 3D Printing: Digital Infringement & Digital Regulation, 14 NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 37 (2016) (exploring patent law issues).
63. See Osborn, supra note 36, at 583 (suggesting that the consumer protection
rationale for trademark law does not apply where consumers themselves violate
trademark protections by printing a counterfeit object).
DICTIONARY
ONLINE,
64. Sharing
Economy,
OXFORD
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/sharing-economy
[http://perma.cc/CJH3-8Y82]; see also Jenny Kassan & Janelle Orsi, The Legal Landscape
of the Sharing Economy, 27 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1, 3 (2012) (listing various collaborative
practices considered to be a part of the sharing economy); DAMIEN DEMAILLY & ANNESOPHIE NOVEL, INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. & INT’L RELATIONS, THE SHARING
ECONOMY: MAKE IT SUSTAINABLE 13–14 (2014), http://www.iddri.org/Evenements
/Interventions/ST0314_DD%20ASN_sharing%20economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/YDW8NU4J] (setting out sharing models of redistribution of goods, mutualization of goods, and
shared mobility); JULIET SCHOR, GREAT TRANSITION INITIATIVE, DEBATING THE
SHARING ECONOMY 2 (2014), http://www.greattransition.org/images/GTI_publications
/Schor_Debating_the_Sharing_Economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/CE8J-QGRW] (describing
the sharing economy as “recirculation of goods, increased utilization of durable assets,
exchange of services, and sharing of productive assets”). It is worth noting that much of
the activity falling under the “sharing economy” rubric does not involve actual sharing of
economic resources. A perhaps more accurate account describes users of digital platforms
as engaging in “shared value creation.” BRHMIE BALARAM, ROYAL SOCIETY FOR THE
ENCOURAGEMENT OF ARTS, MANUFACTURES & COMMERCE, FAIR SHARE:
RECLAIMING POWER IN THE SHARING ECONOMY 15 (2016), https://www.thersa.org
/globalassets/pdfs/reports/rsa-fair-share.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LNY-PJ58].
65. See Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 89–90 (2016);
Noah Zon, The Sharing Economy and Why It Matters for Policy Makers, PUB. SECTOR
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In contrast to DIYbio and 3D printing, which introduce new
ways to invent and produce things, the activities that make up the
sharing economy generally are not themselves new.66 People have
long offered rides, lodging, and other goods and services for
exchange. However, these entrepreneurial activities are occurring
through peer-to-peer exchanges on an unprecedented scale, and
consequently their cumulative impacts are warranting society’s
attention for the first time. Through such platforms as Uber, Airbnb,
and Taskrabbit, “[m]illions of people are becoming part-time
entrepreneurs, disrupting established business models and entrenched
market interests, and challenging regulated industries.”67
Moreover, while sharing-economy activities themselves may not
be novel, there is indeed something novel about the sharing economy
itself. Capitalizing on the ubiquity of smartphones and internet
connectivity, innovators are using digital-platform technologies to
constantly invent new marketplaces for exchange. A leading directory
lists nearly 10,000 sharing-economy companies worldwide, with more
added virtually every day.68 From a regulator’s point of view, the
launch of a new business may hardly be remarkable. The launch of a
new marketplace, however, may be an entirely different matter worth
noting.
Potential benefits of the sharing economy include greater access
to goods and services, lower prices for consumers, and increased
income for providers.69 The sharing economy’s rapid growth reflects
strong interest on the part of both consumers and providers in reaping

DIG., Dec. 2015, at 2, https://mowatcentre.ca/wp-content/uploads/publications
/PublicSectorDigest_TheSharingEconomyandWhyitMattersforPolicyMakers.pdf
[perma.cc
/HZ2W-MBVD].
66. Sofia Ranchordás, Does Sharing Mean Caring? Regulating Innovation in the
Sharing Economy, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 413, 433, 456 (2015).
67. Lobel, supra note 65, at 90–91.
68. Partners, MESH, http://meshing.it/partners [perma.cc/5GMA-GAP3]; see also
Sharing Economy Startups, ANGELLIST, https://angel.co/sharing-economy-4 [https://perma.cc
/Z5DQ-C4E4].
69. See Ranchordás, supra note 66, at 466. In addition, sharing activities that do not
involve direct economic exchange, such as gifting practices or tool lending, strengthen
social capital by facilitating communication and cooperation. See Russell Belk, Sharing, 36
J. CONSUMER RES. 715, 717 (2010) (“Sharing . . . goes hand in hand with trust and
bonding. It differs from economic exchange, which rarely creates communal bonds
with other people.”); see also JULIAN AGYEMAN, DUNCAN MCLAREN & ADRIANNE
SCHAEFER-BORREGO, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, SHARING CITIES 16–17 (2013),
https://www.foe.co.uk/sites/default/files/downloads/agyeman_sharing_cities.pdf
[https://perma.cc/28K2-Q5VX].
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these benefits.70 In economic terms, the sharing economy potentially
addresses various market failures by increasing competition, reducing
transaction costs and informational asymmetry, putting underutilized
capital to use, and challenging the capture of regulatory agencies.71
Notwithstanding these benefits, the sharing economy also raises
various concerns. Participants in sharing-economy transactions may
encounter deceptive techniques, unsafe conditions, or unfair labor
practices.72 For established operators, the sharing economy represents
new competition that may gain an unfair advantage by skirting
traditional regulatory regimes.73 Furthermore, sharing-economy
transactions may generate a range of external effects, including
decreased tax revenue for governments, increased noise and traffic
for neighbors, greater burdens on infrastructure, and disrupted labor
and housing markets.74 Although the notion of “sharing” suggests less
resource-intensive ways of doing things, the overall environmental
impacts of the sharing economy are unclear. Not only does the
sharing economy involve little actual sharing, but the lower prices it
often brings also can foster higher levels of consumption.75
Additionally, the technology underlying the sharing economy collects
vast quantities of data, raising concerns about loss of privacy.
The large numbers of individuals participating in the sharing
economy, often on a part-time basis and through evolving business
models, challenge conventional models of government regulation.76
As one commentator has remarked, “many sharing economy
businesses have violated state or local government laws.”77 The law,
70. See Stephen R. Miller, First Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy, 53
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 147, 157 (2016).
71. Cristopher Koopman, Matthew Mitchell & Adam Thierer, The Sharing Economy
and Consumer Protection Regulation: The Case for Policy Change, 8 J. BUS.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 529, 531–32 (2015); see also Lobel, supra note 65, at 89–90.
72. See Miller, supra note 70, at 152.
73. See Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, but for Local Government
Law: The Future of Local Regulation of the Sharing Economy, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 901, 922–
23 (2015).
74. Kellen Zale, When Everything is Small: The Regulatory Challenge of Scale in the
Sharing Economy, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 949, 983–90 (2016); see also Lobel, supra note
65, at 126–38; Miller, supra note 70, at 169 (noting that sharing economy “harm is often
uniquely challenging to determine” but also suggesting possible community harms
engendered by short-term housing rentals).
75. See DEMAILLY & NOVEL, supra note 64, at 8 (“[S]haring models can either be a
vector for a sustainable, less material type of consumption or, conversely, a vector for the
hyperconsumption of goods.”); SCHOR, supra note 64, at 7 (“The [sharing] platforms are
creating new markets that expand the volume of commerce and boost purchasing
power.”).
76. See Lobel, supra note 65, at 101–02.
77. Miller, supra note 70, at 149.
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which works through definitions, rules, and boundaries, is often
poorly equipped to keep up with the sharing economy and its
dynamic and distributed nature.78
*

*

*

The preceding discussion highlights leading examples of
distributed innovation. DIYbio, 3D printing, and the sharing
economy shift power away from government, big business, and other
traditionally powerful institutions. Yet these examples are just a
subset of emerging technologies that pose new governance
challenges.79 Across society, rapid technological change—whether in
the form of drones, autonomous vehicles, digital currencies, or smart
infrastructure—threatens to disrupt conventional regulatory models.80
In an ever-changing environment, where individual conduct can have
dramatic consequences for society, how can society govern that
conduct?
II. CHALLENGES THAT DISTRIBUTED-INNOVATION TECHNOLOGIES
POSE FOR REGULATORS
Distributed innovation can be a powerful force for economic
growth, technological breakthroughs, and social change. Drawing on
the energy and creativity of individuals to produce new products and
services, distributed innovation broadens the innovation process.
Furthermore, distributed innovation can offer personal fulfillment
and generate income while putting underutilized human and real
capital to work.81
Distributed innovation nonetheless warrants the attention of
regulators. Participants in distributed innovation themselves may
need protection, and distributed-innovation activities may have
adverse consequences on non-participants as well. Oversight—
broadly understood here to refer to some form of third-party
intervention, governmental or otherwise—can correct market

78. See Lobel, supra note 65, at 102.
79. See Larry Downes, Fewer, Faster, Smarter, DEMOCRACY J., Fall 2015, at 3,
http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/38/fewer-faster-smarter/
[https://perma.cc/JV5UGR6G].
80. Id. Contemporary methods of terrorism, in which terror groups use social media
to radicalize, recruit, and inspire terrorist activity in disparate locations, raise similar
challenges. See YONAH ALEXANDER & DEAN ALEXANDER, THE ISLAMIC STATE:
COMBATING THE CALIPHATE WITHOUT BORDERS 55 (2015).
81. Lakhani & Panetta, supra note 2, at 103–04.
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failures, incentivize competition, and ensure a level playing field.
Equally important, oversight can “address public safety, quality
control, privacy, access, equality, fairness, and distributional
concerns.”82
This Part explores a number of reasons why distributed
innovation poses particular difficulties for regulators. Law’s
categorical nature makes it difficult to apply to dynamic and
differentiated processes. Logistical, political, and cultural barriers
may hamper regulation of distributed innovation. Even further, the
harms associated with distributed innovation may be difficult to
identify.
A. Law’s Categorical Nature
Law is often viewed as hostile to innovation. Undoubtedly,
regulatory environments may involve rigid hierarchies, inflexible
processes, and aversion to change.83 Yet policymakers face the tricky
task of balancing competing interests when regulating innovation.
Excessive regulatory burdens can stifle innovation but so can
regulatory uncertainty.84 Well-designed laws—in tax, intellectual
property, and other areas—can create incentives for innovation and
foster a stable environment in which people are willing to invest
efforts and resources in innovation.85
Law relies on the process of categorization to determine what
and how behavior is governed.86 But distributed-innovation activities
often do not fit neatly within existing legal categories.87 The sharing
economy provides numerous examples of this difficulty, as legal
battles rage over whether to regulate Uber drivers like taxi drivers,

82. Lobel, supra note 65, at 118; see SUNIL JOHAL & NOAH ZON, MOWAT CTR.,
POLICYMAKING FOR THE SHARING ECONOMY: BEYOND WHACK-A-MOLE 13 (2015),
https://mowatcentre.ca/wp-content/uploads/publications/106_policymaking_for_the_sharing
_economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/JMK6-5BJH] (“In many cases, unfamiliarity with sharing
economy models has hindered the ability of governments to recognize potential benefits
such as innovation, economic growth, and more efficient networks for urban
transportation and logistics.”).
83. See JOHAL & ZON, supra note 82, at 14–17.
84. Ranchordás, supra note 66, at 440–42.
85. See id. at 448; see also ALBERT C. LIN, PROMETHEUS REIMAGINED:
TECHNOLOGY, ENVIRONMENT, AND LAW IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 7 (2013);
Gaia Bernstein, In the Shadow of Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2257, 2264–69 (2010)
(summarizing debates on role of law in fostering innovation).
86. See Lobel, supra note 65, at 102 (“Law and language attempt to chart boundaries,
and yet they are inherently limited in covering all forms of life and human imagination.”).
87. See Vanessa Katz, Note, Regulating the Sharing Economy, 30 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1067, 1092 (2015); see also JOHAL & ZON, supra note 82, at 13.
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whether to treat Airbnb hosts like hotel operators, and how to govern
digital platforms themselves.88 Heavy-handed attempts to apply
existing laws to individual operators may chill economically
productive activity or drive it underground, making it harder to track,
assess, and regulate.89
In some instances, distributed-innovation activities may fall
completely outside of existing oversight structures. Many laws were
“designed for a Fordist era of mass production, where centralised
entities are producing items which are then sold in shops and bought
complete by consumers.”90 Regulatory regimes may exempt smallscale operators, explicitly or implicitly, because the benefit from
regulating de minimis activities may not justify the effort.91 Smallscale exemptions also can protect privacy or advance a societal
interest in lowering barriers to entry.92 Nevertheless, the key
assumption underlying such exemptions—that the effects of smallscale activities do not matter—may not hold true in an increasing
number of contexts.93 Collectively, distributed-innovation activities
may achieve such a scale that they can significantly affect surrounding
88. See Eric Biber et al., Regulating Business Innovation as Policy Disruption: From
the Model T to Airbnb, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1561, 1581–84 (2017) (discussing policy
disruptions fueled by business innovation). California, for example, has established a
regulatory system to govern Lyft, UberX, and other “transportation network companies,”
a term defined to include “an organization . . . that provides prearranged transportation
services for compensation using an online-enabled application (app) or platform to
connect passengers with drivers using their personal vehicles.” Decision Adopting Rules
and Regulations to Protect Public Safety While Allowing New Entrants to the
Transportation Industry at 2, Decision No. 13-09-045, Rulemaking No. 12-12-011 (Cal.
Pub. Utils. Comm’n Sept. 19, 2013), 2013 WL 10230598, at *1; see Sarah E. Light,
Precautionary Federalism and the Sharing Economy, 66 EMORY L.J. 333, 377 (2017)
(noting that the California “rule appears to have served as a model for other states”).
89. See Miller, supra note 70, at 168 (citing the failure of a heavy-handed approach to
regulating illegal music sharing).
90. Angela Daly, Don’t Believe the Hype? Recent 3D Printing Developments for Law
and Society, in 3D PRINTING AND BEYOND: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND LEGAL
IMPLICATIONS SURROUNDING 3D PRINTING AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGY (Lemley et
al. eds.) (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 4), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=2800955 [https://perma.cc/J8BH-BBJA].
91. See, e.g., Eric Biber & J.B. Ruhl, The Permit Power Revisited: The Theory and
Practice of Regulatory Permits in the Administrative State, 64 DUKE L.J. 133, 219 (2014)
(discussing environmental law exemptions for “many of the individually small human
actions that contribute to [pressing environmental] harms”); Kevin M. Stack & Michael P.
Vandenbergh, The One Percent Problem, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1385, 1394–96 (2011)
(identifying various instances in which “[t]he law exempts small contributors and entities
from regulation”); Zale, supra note 74, at 960–61.
92. Zale, supra note 74, at 961–67 (discussing various factors justifying regulatory
leniency for small-scale activities).
93. JOHAL & ZON, supra note 82, at 14 (noting that sharing economy has transformed
the scale of such activities, making them so significant as to require regulatory attention).
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environments and existing markets.94 Under such circumstances, the
exemption of small-scale activities may lead to the failure to achieve
regulatory goals.95 Sometimes, regulatory attention to small-scale
activity may be warranted even if its expected cumulative effects are
small. DIYbio experiments offer an example of seemingly
insignificant activity whose potential for catastrophic consequences
may necessitate some form of oversight.96
B.

Barriers to Applying Law

Where existing legal regimes do apply to distributed-innovation
activities, logistical, political, and cultural barriers may make it
difficult to monitor and enforce existing laws against those activities.
Merely identifying participants in distributed-innovation activities
poses a challenge because their participation may be sporadic,
anonymous, or of low magnitude.97 Even if participants are
identifiable, there are still other logistical challenges, as it can be
costly and resource-intensive to administer regulatory requirements
to a large number of entities or individuals scattered across various
locations. In addition, the application of legal regimes to distributedinnovation activities may also face political difficulties; some
individuals resist regulatory burdens they perceive as excessive.
Difficulties may be cultural as well. 3D printing, for example, is
becoming popular among communities of users that may lack a
“history of safe manufacturing, such as maker communities, small
startups, schools and hobbyists.”98 Similarly, individual participants in
the sharing economy lack the familiarity and expertise of large
corporations in navigating complex regulatory requirements.99

94. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 70, at 160–61 (noting that Airbnb offers more rooms
than, and has a market valuation comparable to, the largest hotel chains).
95. Cf. Stack & Vandenbergh, supra note 91, at 1397–98 (remarking, in context of
climate change, that “[s]mall potatoes might be discarded (or discardable), but the
calculation for doing so changes if there are only small potatoes”).
96. See supra notes 25–34 and accompanying text (discussing potential risks associated
with DIYbio activities).
97. See, e.g., Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 62, at 1323 (observing that digital
manufacturing technology “decentralizes and partially anonymizes the manufacture of
tangible objects”).
98. DAVID REJESKI & YONG HUANG, WILSON CTR., ENVIRONMENTAL AND
HEALTH IMPACTS OF ADDITIVE MANUFACTURING 10 (2015), https://www.wilsoncenter.org
/sites/default/files/nsf_am_env_final_red.pdf [https://perma.cc/NP2N-8T47].
99. See Miller, supra note 70, at 167–68 (noting that most participants in short-term
rental market “often have no experience with the regulatory structures businesses face in
either the physical or administrative environments”).
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Further complicating matters, the dispersed nature of
distributed-innovation activities may make any associated harms
difficult to identify. For example, sharing-economy activities may
adversely affect neighbors or other members of a community.100
However, these effects are generally less obvious than those
associated with a traditional operator, who, as part of the
conventional permitting process, may have adopted measures to
mitigate those externalities.101 Similarly, 3D printing may result in
chemical exposure and contribute to chronic health problems.102
While these sorts of hazards are often overlooked, they may be
especially likely to escape attention if they occur in the home. DIYbio
also may involve uncertain harms or hazards that are hard to identify.
In particular, the risks associated with an engineered microorganism’s
escape into the environment may be impossible to determine ahead
of time.103 Furthermore, any escape may not be detected until after it
is too late to deploy measures to kill or contain the microorganism.
Finally, the dynamic nature of distributed innovation adds a
further layer of complexity for would-be regulators. The sharing
economy provides perhaps the most obvious example: it has
introduced new business models at a dizzying rate, thanks in large
part to minimal infrastructure requirements.104 In these rapidly
changing conditions, conventional approaches to regulation, which
rely heavily on command-and-control techniques and prescriptive
standards, may be unable to respond to change in a timely manner.105
The rulemaking processes typically used to establish or change such
standards are often cumbersome, costly, and time-consuming.106 A
failure to update legal standards can reinforce the status quo or leave
innovative technologies without oversight, resulting in regulatory
gaps. Regulatory efforts attempting to keep pace with distributed
innovation are likely to resemble “a frantic game of ‘whack-a-mole’”
100. See id. at 170.
101. See id. at 170–71 (suggesting that harms associated with short-term residential
rentals, though “plausible,” ring “as alarmist, the causation highly attenuated,” and
primarily psychological in nature).
102. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
103. See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., PREPARING FOR FUTURE
PRODUCTS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 7, 110–11 (2017) (discussing the development of
genomically engineered microorganisms and synthetic communities of microbes that have
few or no comparators, as a result of which risk assessment is more difficult).
104. See Lobel, supra note 65, at 102 (“The most important aspect of the platform
economy is that it includes an ecology of continuously evolving business models.”).
105. See JOHAL & ZON, supra note 82, at 14.
106. See Albert C. Lin, Preliminary Injunctive Regulation, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1027,
1035–40 (2016).
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as new enterprises rapidly render legal categories and standards
obsolete.107
None of the above discussion even touches on the jurisdictional
issues that distributed innovation raises. Because of their novelty and
small scale, distributed-innovation activities often fall into regulatory
gaps, thereby raising the issue of who might be an appropriate
regulator. Federal, state, or local governments may assume that some
other level of government will address a new concern. Within a single
level of government, agencies may assume that some other agency
will act. And even when an agency recognizes that an issue falls
within its jurisdiction, organizational hierarchies and silos may
impede the development of an optimal regulatory approach.108
Various features of distributed innovation, including difficulty of
definition, dynamic change, complexity of causation, fragmented
activity, and autonomous social actors, confound conventional
regulation.109 These factors demonstrate that careful attention is
needed when designing regulatory tools for these areas and
contemplating additional means of oversight. Given these unique
features, it may prove especially useful to consider how regulators
have addressed regulatory concerns outside of conventional contexts
when crafting regulations for distributed innovation.
III. INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIORS & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
How can society address the challenge of overseeing distributed
innovation without unduly hampering it? As this challenge is largely
one of managing small-scale behavior, valuable insights may be
gained by considering environmental regulatory responses to smallscale behavior in other contexts. First, United States environmental
law and legal academics have increasingly directed their attention to
individual behaviors that contribute to environmental harms. Second,
developing countries have long struggled with addressing small-scale
activities that have large cumulative effects on the environment.
Experience in these areas suggests that “decentred regulation”—
regulation that acknowledges government’s limited capacity in certain

107. JOHAL & ZON, supra note 82, at 1, 13 (noting that “the speed and scale of change
and the difficulty of categorizing [sharing economy] enterprises” are key characteristics
that challenge policymakers).
108. Id. at 16.
109. See Julia Black, Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and
Self-Regulation in a “Post-Regulatory” World, 54 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 103, 106–12
(2001).
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circumstances to control conduct and that enlists nongovernmental
actors to assist in the task—offers an important approach.110
A. Recognizing the Role of Individual Behavior in United States
Environmental Law
Historically, American environmental law focused on industrial
and commercial facilities (hereafter referred to collectively as
“industrial facilities”) as the primary subjects of regulation.111 While
current regulation has largely maintained this focus, scholars and
regulators have also come to recognize the significant contribution of
individual behaviors to environmental problems.
The premise underlying this focus—that industrial facilities
generate the bulk of environmental harms and, therefore, should bear
the primary burden of addressing them112—was generally a
reasonable one. Pollution from industrial facilities is often harmful,
obvious, and readily controllable. Compared to other pollution
sources, such facilities are relatively homogenous, few in number,
and, consequently, administratively easier to regulate.113 Accordingly,
the federal and state governments applied schemes of command-andcontrol regulation to industrial facilities, and, in response to
complaints of inefficiency and inflexibility, later added economic
incentive programs that continued to focus on these sources.114
Individuals, by contrast, largely received a “free pass” from federal
environmental regulation.115 The attention to industrial facilities,
though somewhat simplistic, yielded substantial progress in reducing
pollution.
Significant challenges remain, however, and new threats—most
notably climate change—have gained prominence. Perceiving the
limitations of focusing on industrial pollution, various scholars have
drawn attention to the contributions of individual behavior to climate

110. See id. at 112–13.
111. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as
Regulated Entity in the New Era of Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515, 524–26
(2004).
112. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Social Meaning of Environmental Command
and Control, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 191, 206 (2001).
113. Id.
114. See Vandenbergh, supra note 111, at 526–29. In command-and-control schemes,
“the government sets both the environmental ends to be achieved . . . and the methods by
which they will be achieved . . . .” Id. at 526.
115. See, e.g., Katrina Fischer Kuh, An Unnatural Divide: How Law Obscures
Individual Environmental Harms, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND CONTRASTING IDEAS
OF NATURE 28, 28–29 (Keith H. Hirokawa ed., 2014).
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change, water pollution, and other problems.116 Environmentally
significant individual behaviors include motor vehicle use, household
energy consumption, and use of cleaners, pesticides, and other
consumer products.117 These often habitual behaviors may be hard to
change, and they frequently take place within the home, making them
problematic to police. Yet because of the cumulative environmental
significance of these behaviors, regulating industry alone will not be
enough.118 Indeed, individual behavior’s proportional contribution to
environmental problems will only grow as regulators continue to
ratchet down industrial pollution.119 Failing to regulate individual
behavior not only leaves environmental problems unaddressed but
also sends a misleading message that individuals are not responsible
for environmental harms.120
Although the environmental significance of individual behavior
has been acknowledged, this recognition has not necessarily
prompted its regulation. Indeed, two of the leading federal initiatives
to reduce greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions exemplify a continued
focus on industrial sources of pollution. First, the Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”) crafted the 2010 Tailoring Rule, which
governs new sources of GHG emissions, specifically to avoid

116. See Biber & Ruhl, supra note 91, at 214–16; Katrina Fischer Kuh, When
Government Intrudes: Regulating Individual Behaviors That Harm the Environment, 61
DUKE L.J. 1111, 1114–15 (2012); Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Individual as Polluter, 35
ENVTL. L. REP. 10723, 10724 (2005); Vandenbergh, supra note 112, at 196; Michael P.
Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinemann, The Carbon-Neutral Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1673, 1687–89 (2007).
117. See Vandenbergh, supra note 111, at 541–84 (examining “individuals’ emissions of
several important pollutants: low-level ozone or smog, mercury, several air toxics from
mobile sources, pesticides, and petroleum”); Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 116,
at 1690–93 (analyzing “emissions attributable to personal motor vehicle use, personal air
travel . . . mass transport. . . . [and] household electricity use”).
118. See Stack & Vandenbergh, supra note 91, at 1388 (describing the “one percent
problem” as a situation “where small contributors account for so much of a regulatory
problem that the social goal cannot be met without regulating many one percent
sources”).
119. See, e.g., Vandenbergh, supra note 111, at 537–84 (reviewing contributions of
individuals to various pollution problems and concluding that “individuals’ proportionate
share may be growing”); Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 116, at 1693–95
(estimating carbon emissions from individual behavior in the United States and their
implications).
120. See Kuh, supra note 115, at 30–31 (“By focusing on commercial and industrial
sources of pollution and resource consumption, core environmental statutes might be said
to express the view that those commercial and industrial sources are polluters—to be
condemned and curbed—while individuals are not.”); Vandenbergh, supra note 112, at
204–11 (analyzing the potential social perceptions of environmental harm that commandand-control policies created).
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regulating smaller sources of GHGs.121 The EPA feared that literal
application of the regulatory thresholds found in the Clean Air Act
would require the issuance of 6.1 million permits and $21 billion in
administrative costs.122 Accordingly, the EPA developed higher
thresholds designed to require the issuance of only 15,000 permits and
impose only $62 million in administrative costs.123 The centerpiece of
the Obama Administration’s EPA’s GHG reduction efforts, the 2015
Clean Power Plan,124 provides another example where individual
behavior is neglected. This regulation focuses on reducing carbon
pollution from power plants rather than on regulating other GHGgenerating behavior, including individual behavior, directly.125
The pollutant releases and environmental harms caused by
individuals do differ in important ways from those caused by
industrial facilities.126 Pollutant releases by individuals come from
more numerous sources and are often less than salient.127
Environmental harms from individual behavior tend to be gradual,
cumulative, and less obvious than those caused by industrial
sources.128 Individual pollution is akin to pollution from other
dispersed sources such as small businesses, family farms, or nonpoint
sources.129 For dispersed sources of pollution, the large number of
sources and their relative lack of familiarity with the regulatory
system pose unique challenges for regulation, monitoring, and
121. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,514 (June 3, 2010) (codified in scattered parts of 40 C.F.R.).
122. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2443 (2014). The Supreme
Court found the EPA’s “rewriting of the statutory thresholds [to be] impermissible” but
nevertheless upheld part of the Tailoring Rule under a different statutory provision. Id. at
2445, 2448–49.
123. See id. at 2443.
124. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,622 (Oct. 23, 2015) (codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 60).
125. Id. The Supreme Court stayed the Clean Power Plan, see West Virginia v. EPA,
136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016) (mem.), and the Trump Administration’s EPA intends to repeal it.
Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 51,787, 51,787 (proposed Nov. 8, 2017); see also
Lisa Friedman & Brad Plumer, E.P.A. Announces Repeal of Major Obama-Era Carbon
Emissions Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/09/climate
/clean-power-plan.html [https://perma.cc/BP8W-TFNS (dark archive)].
126. Vandenbergh, supra note 111, at 589.
127. See id. at 589–90.
128. Id. at 590.
129. See Daniel A. Farber, Controlling Pollution by Individuals and Other Dispersed
Sources, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10745, 10746 (2005). The federal Clean Water Act focuses on
point sources of pollution and leaves regulation of nonpoint sources largely to the states.
See HOLLY DOREMUS, ALBERT C. LIN & RONALD H. ROSENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY LAW 768–69 (6th ed. 2012).
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enforcement.130 Moreover, whereas we can reasonably predict
corporate behavior by assuming that corporations respond rationally
to regulation and other incentives,131 individual behavior is more
difficult to predict because of cognitive biases, social influences, and
lack of information.132
B.

Options for Governing Individual Behavior

Individual behavior may be more difficult to govern than
industrial behavior, but it need not be ungovernable. Options for
governing individual behavior include direct regulation, economic
incentives, general permits, upstream regulation, social norms, and
technological management. This Section describes each of these
options and considers their relative merits.
1. Direct Regulation
Conventional wisdom states that traditional methods of
regulation are poorly suited for governing environmentally significant
individual behavior.133 Pollution controls typically applied to
industrial facilities may not work for small sources, and implementing
controls against numerous sources may be too expensive, intrusive, or
politically infeasible.134 Attempts to limit vehicle use in Los Angeles
in the 1970s exemplify these difficulties.135 These efforts, which
included gasoline rationing and other seemingly drastic measures,
were abandoned after a vehement public reaction.136 Recent efforts to
restrict lawn pesticide use and residential wood burning have
sometimes encountered a similar response, resulting in them never
going into effect.137
130. See Farber, supra note 129, at 10746.
131. Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 116, at 1739.
132. Id. at 1739.
133. See Kuh, supra note 116, at 1120 (“The existing literature’s relative inattention to
direct mandates on environmentally significant individual behaviors stems from the
perception that applying mandates to most environmentally significant individual
behaviors would simply be infeasible.”).
134. See Vandenbergh, supra note 111, at 597–98.
135. See id. at 555.
136. Craig N. Oren, How a Mandate Came from Hell: The Making of the Federal
Employee Trip Reduction Program, 28 ENVTL. L. 267, 277–78 (1998). In recent years,
congestion pricing has been adopted with some success in London, Singapore, and
Stockholm, and it is now under serious consideration in New York City. See Christina
Anderson et al., Should New York Look Abroad to Get Out of Its Traffic Jam?, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 2018, at A15.
137. Rachel Chason, Court Strikes Down Montgomery County’s Ban on Lawn
Pesticides, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics
/judge-rules-against-controversial-montgomery-county-ban-on-lawn-pesticides/2017/08/03
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Counterexamples nonetheless demonstrate the feasibility of
some direct regulation of individuals. State or local laws may prohibit
littering or require individuals to conserve water, separate trash, or
recycle electronic waste.138 Local zoning laws restrict what landowners
can do on their land.139 Under certain circumstances federal law also
restricts private land use, as through the Endangered Species Act’s
“take” prohibition and the Clean Water Act’s wetlands permitting
requirement.140 Monitoring of individual compliance may involve
resource-intensive inspections or high-technology surveillance.141 To
counter objections to direct regulation based on cost, inconvenience,
or unfairness, policymakers may offer information, technical help, or
other forms of compliance assistance.142
Tort law also regulates individual behavior, albeit less directly
than command-and-control regulation. While tort law provides an ex
post remedy for damages, it also deters ex ante behaviors that could
result in liability.143 Ordinarily, individual conduct is governed by the
doctrine of negligence, which imposes a duty to take reasonable
precautions against creating risks of injury to others.144 More
demanding standards can apply in special circumstances, however.
Strict liability applies to abnormally dangerous conduct or defective
products, for example.145 And the existence of a “special
relationship”—for example, as between landlord and tenant, or
innkeeper and guest—also can give rise to a heightened duty of
care.146 Regardless of the specific standard that may apply, the general
/7350d7d2-7858-11e7-8f39-eeb7d3a2d304_story.html [https://perma.cc/9NE2-3WC5]; Brian
Maffly, Wood-Burning Ban Coming off the Table, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Feb. 2, 2015, 9:46
PM), http://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=2131384&itype=CMSID [https://perma.cc
/6CMY-4S7V].
138. Kuh, supra note 116, at 1132–33.
139. Id. at 1161.
140. See id. at 1135–47 (describing the limits imposed on private behavior by the Clean
Air Act, Clean Water Act, and the Endangered Species Act).
141. See id. at 1134.
142. See Vandenbergh, supra note 111, at 599. Many jurisdictions restrict the disposal
of used motor oil or require recycling, for example, but they offer convenient drop-off
options to reduce incentives for illegal disposal. See id.
143. See Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence
and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1816–18, 1831 (1997); see also DAN B.
DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK ON TORTS 23 (2d ed. 2016).
144. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 6
(Am. Law Inst. 2010); DOBBS ET AL., supra note 143, at 197–98.
145. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 20;
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (Am. Law Inst. 1998); see
also DOBBS ET AL., supra note 143, at 784, 804.
146. See Katz, supra note 87, at 1077–80 (discussing “assumptions that justify the
common law treatment of ‘special relationships,’ and how these assumptions continue to

96 N.C. L. REV. 945 (2018)

2018]

HERDING CATS

971

applicability of tort law makes it an important backstop to
conventional regulation, particularly where new technologies and
other changing circumstances can lead to regulatory gaps.147
2. Economic Incentives
Government also can encourage environmentally positive
behavior or discourage environmentally harmful behavior through
subsidies or taxes, which are generally viewed as less coercive than
command-and-control regulation.148 Subsidies and taxes are relatively
straightforward to administer. Though subsidies may be more
politically palatable than taxes, their financial tab can be a substantial
barrier to adoption.149 Furthermore, subsidies—and taxes—may
undermine environmental goals by framing environmental protection
as a commodity rather than a moral responsibility.150
Economic incentives also include emission allowance trading and
similar market-based mechanisms, which have received much
attention because of their potential to achieve environmental goals in
a cost-effective manner.151 The utility of such mechanisms for
regulating individual behavior may be limited, however.
Administrative and transaction costs can be high, particularly when a
large number of actors are involved, and these mechanisms require
substantial data for successful implementation.152

inform modern regulatory frameworks”). But cf. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 143, at 492 &
n.291 (noting several cases where courts did not apply a strict liability standard to
landlords).
147. See Adam D.K. Abelkop, Tort Law as an Environmental Policy Instrument, 92
OR. L. REV. 381, 464–69 (2013); see also DOREMUS ET AL., supra note 129, at 40.
148. See William M. Sage & David A. Hyman, Combating Antimicrobial Resistance:
Regulatory Strategies and Institutional Capacity, 84 TUL. L. REV. 781, 803–04 (2010). See
generally Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh, Environmental Regulation of Households: An
Empirical Review of Economic and Psychological Factors, 66 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 559
(2008) (reviewing effect of pricing and other mechanisms on household and individual
behavior).
149. Andrew Green, You Can’t Pay Them Enough: Subsidies, Environmental Law, and
Social Norms, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 407, 425–26 (2006).
150. See id. at 408, 431–33.
151. See Daniel P. Selmi, Federal Implementation Plans and the Path to Clean Power,
28 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 637, 652–53 (2016).
152. See Vandenbergh, supra note 111, at 601 (noting that “environmental impacts of
individual behavior are the product of very small, diffuse releases of pollutants . . . that are
widely distributed among victims”). Notwithstanding these limitations, dispersed pollution
sources are sometimes incorporated into a pollution trading regime through the use of
offsets. See Farber, supra note 129, at 10752. Under an offset mechanism, regulated
entities pay for pollution reductions by unregulated entities and are credited with offsets
towards their own pollution emissions. Ensuring that offsets represent real reductions in
emissions is often a challenge, however, particularly when the sources generating the
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3. General Permits
General permits, which impose relatively light administrative
burdens, are one means by which to tailor conventional commandand-control approaches to dispersed pollution sources. Like an
ordinary permit, a general permit contains enforceable pollution
limits and permit conditions.153 But unlike an ordinary permit, a
general permit applies to multiple sources, which obtain coverage
under the permit simply by submitting a notice to the government or
otherwise complying with permit conditions.154 The government may
require a source covered by a general permit to apply for an
individual permit if the source contributes significantly to pollution,
violates the conditions of the general permit, or under other specified
circumstances.155
General permits have been widely used under the Clean Water
Act (“CWA”).156 Section 404 of the CWA, which governs permits for
discharging dredged or fill material into the waters of the United
States, authorizes the issuance of general permits for activities that
“are similar in nature, will cause only minimal adverse environmental
effects when performed separately, and will have only minimal
cumulative adverse effect on the environment.”157 General permits
have also been issued under section 402 of the CWA, which governs
discharges of pollution into United States waters.158 The difficulty of
offsets are dispersed and difficult to monitor. See Albert C. Lin, Myths of Environmental
Law, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 45, 51 (2015).
153. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.28 (2017) (providing general permit requirements for various
pollutants covered by the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System); Steven G.
Davison, General Permits Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 26 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 35, 67–68 (2009); Jeffrey M. Gaba, Generally Illegal: NPDES General Permits Under
the Clean Water Act, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 409, 410, 419 (2007).
154. See Gaba, supra note 153, at 410–11, 419 (describing general permits used under
Clean Air Act regulatory scheme); see also Biber & Ruhl, supra note 91, at 156
(distinguishing between an exemption and a general permit in that the latter typically
requires the filing of a form). A general permit also differs from an ordinary permit in that
a general permit is developed through notice-and-comment rulemaking rather than
through individualized adjudication. See Biber & Ruhl, supra note 91, at 165–66; Gaba,
supra note 153, at 411.
155. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(2) (2012) (permitting the government to revoke or
amend a general permit if “such activities are more appropriately authorized by individual
permits”); 40 C.F.R. § 122.28(b)(3) (allowing the EPA to require individual pollution
permits under the Clean Water Act regulatory scheme).
156. Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387).
157. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e) (providing that general permits for dredged or fill material
may be revoked or modified if activities have an adverse impact on the environment or are
more appropriately authorized by individual permits).
158. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342; 40 C.F.R. § 122.28(a).
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using individual permits to regulate discharges that are numerous and
not readily subject to ordinary pollution control technology, such as
storm sewer discharges, prompted the EPA to adopt the general
permitting technique.159
General permitting systems are less expensive and require less
regulatory infrastructure than individual permitting systems.160 At the
same time, general permitting systems can provide information that
enables the government to conduct inspections and determine further
regulatory needs.161 Although general permitting systems require
agencies to make significant initial investments in a rulemaking
process to establish each permit, they do not require as much
oversight.162 Once a general permit issues, the agency need not
conduct the assessment, negotiation, and review normally associated
with each specific permit.163 The tradeoff is that general permitting
systems do not allow for individualized assessments of harm.164 Thus,
general permits are best suited for classes of activities with relatively
predictable and uniform effects, and less so where individualized
assessments would provide important information. A higher risk of
environmental harm, or high levels of uncertainty regarding the risk
of harm, may warrant use of specific permits instead.165
One of the most significant reasons to use general permits is
political: “General permits can allow for regulation with an especially
light touch,” and thus may be particularly suited for governing
“everyday activities” where there exists “a general expectation that
the activity should be permitted.”166 If it turns out that those activities
warrant more stringent regulation—perhaps because of increasing
levels of activity or new information regarding harmful effects—the
existence of a general permit might lay the groundwork for more
expansive regulation.167

159. See Gaba, supra note 153, at 420–21, 429–30.
160. See Biber & Ruhl, supra note 91, at 159, 165–66 (contrasting the process for
obtaining a specific permit, which can involve “an enormous and expensive hassle,” and
obtaining a general permit, which may “ask[] for only a name and an address [and] is a
piece of cake”).
161. Id. at 156.
162. See id. at 169.
163. See id. at 169, 171.
164. General permitting under the CWA, for example, avoids the usual “site-specific
assessment[s] that underlie[] compliance with various elements of water quality
standards.” Gaba, supra note 153, at 433 (discussing how the EPA’s NPDES general
permit program may violate requirements of the CWA).
165. See Biber & Ruhl, supra note 91, at 178.
166. Id. at 198.
167. See id. at 218.
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4. Upstream Regulation
Instead of directly regulating individual conduct, a government
might influence individual behavior by regulating larger entities that
supply the individuals or otherwise relate to individual behavior. By
focusing on entities that are logistically easier to regulate, upstream
regulation avoids the need to oversee and monitor numerous
individual actors’ behavior.168 For example, imposing pollution
standards on new car manufacturers is easier than restricting
individual drivers or their pollution emissions.169
Larger entities may serve as a source of leverage without
necessarily restricting individual behavioral options.170 On their own,
or in response to regulatory requirements, energy utilities employ
demand response and energy efficiency programs to reduce peak
demand or total electricity consumption.171 Through these programs,
utilities offer customers economic incentives to alter how and when
they consume electricity.172 Similarly, extended producer
responsibility programs require electronics manufacturers to take
back used electronics or to bear the financial responsibility for doing
so.173 These programs incentivize, but do not require, individuals to
act in environmentally responsible ways.
Several factors may favor an upstream approach over direct
regulation of individuals. When environmental harms are caused by
dispersed sources, upstream regulation is generally more feasible and
less costly because there are fewer entities to regulate.174 Upstream
regulation can offer greater regulatory coverage to the extent that
downstream regulation of some actors is simply not practicable.175 On
168. See Erin T. Mansur, Upstream Versus Downstream Implementation of Climate
Policy, in THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF US CLIMATE POLICY 179, 184–85
(Don Fullerton & Catherine Wolfram eds., 2012); Farber, supra note 129, at 10747. Here,
downstream regulation refers to the regulation of entities whose conduct is of primary
concern, whereas upstream regulation refers to regulation of parties further up the supply
or production chain. See Mansur, supra, at 181.
169. See Farber, supra note 129, at 10747.
170. See id. at 10751–52.
171. See Shelley Welton, Non-Transmission Alternatives, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
457, 465–66 (2015).
172. See id.
173. Noah Sachs, Planning the Funeral at the Birth: Extended Producer Responsibility
in the European Union and the United States, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 51, 52–53 (2006).
174. See TIM HARGRAVE, CTR. FOR CLEAN AIR POL’Y, US CARBON EMISSIONS
TRADING: DESCRIPTION OF AN UPSTREAM APPROACH 6 (1998), http://ccap.org/assets/US
-Carbon-Emissions-Trading-Description-of-an-Upstream-Approach_CCAP-March1998.pdf
[http://perma.cc/LC5B-F4NZ].
175. See id. at 1 (noting that, unlike a downstream system, upstream system for carbon
emission trading “would capture virtually all fossil fuel use and carbon emissions”).
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the flip side, upstream regulation may provide weaker behavioral
signals to individual actors than direct regulation downstream.176
Exclusive reliance on upstream regulation also may result in missed
opportunities for additional environmental gains.177
5. Activating or Shaping Norms
Individual decisions are motivated not only by economic
calculations but also by perceived social sanctions or rewards.178
Social norms—spoken or unspoken rules that guide social behavior—
can powerfully influence individual conduct. Personal norms—
“informal obligations that are enforced through an internalized sense
of duty to act, as well as guilt or related emotions for a failure to
act”—also motivate behavior.179 The importance of norms to behavior
suggests their potential utility in helping to manage the risks of
distributed innovation.180
Communities can put social pressure on individuals engaging in
environmentally harmful behavior to conform to social expectations
by drawing attention to such behavior and engaging with the
individuals involved.181 Describing behavioral regularities and
disseminating information regarding a behavior’s environmental
impacts are specific techniques that rely on norms to prompt
behavioral change.182 For example, some hotels encourage towel reuse by describing the commonality of towel re-use or by invoking the
environmental benefits of the practice.183

176. See id. (noting that upstream system for carbon emission trading would offer
weaker “incentive[s] for energy efficiency and fuel switching” because of reliance on
“price signal[s] rather than direct regulation”); see also Mansur, supra note 168, at 191
(noting the proposition that “carbon price near the point of emissions . . . will make the
policy more salient for the polluter and, therefore, result in greater response”).
177. Compare HARGRAVE, supra note 174, at 2 (noting possibility that “an upstream
system [for carbon emission trading] . . . would provide no incentive to employ end use
emissions treatment technologies”), with Mansur, supra note 168, at 181 (suggesting use of
offsets in upstream regulation schemes to “reward firms for choosing to abate
downstream”).
178. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Amanda R. Carrico & Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Regulation in the Behavioral Era, 95 MINN. L. REV. 715, 723 (2011).
179. Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 116, at 1706.
180. Tools relying on social norms are often more effective when used in combination
with other mechanisms, such as financial incentives and technology mandates. See Michael
P. Vandenbergh, Jack Barkenbus & Jonathan Gilligan, Individual Carbon Emissions: The
Low-Hanging Fruit, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1754 (2008).
181. See Farber, supra note 129, at 10749–51.
182. See Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 116, at 1707.
183. See Noah J. Goldstein, Robert B. Cialdini & Vladas Griskevicius, A Room with a
Viewpoint: Using Social Norms to Motivate Environmental Conservation in Hotels, 35 J.

96 N.C. L. REV. 945 (2018)

976

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96

The premise underlying these approaches is that recipients of
information will individually determine that their behavior is
inappropriate and then change their behavior accordingly.184 Because
individuals often behave in accordance with perceived norms,
presenting information regarding descriptive norms may correct
misperceptions about actual behavior.185 Describing a behavior as
common may not always lead to the desired behavioral change,
though; increasing the awareness of descriptive norms could
encourage those individuals who do not usually engage in undesirable
but common behavior to start behaving this way more often.186
Focusing on the harmful effects of individual behaviors, or on social
disapproval of such behaviors, may help to activate norms regarding
appropriate conduct.187
Lack of information may be only one of several barriers to
behavioral change.188 If individuals perceive behavioral change as
inconvenient or ineffective, additional tools may be needed to
counter that perception.189 Of particular interest are tools that build
on behavioral scientists’ insights regarding cognitive biases and the

CONSUMER RES. 472, 473–75 (2008) (finding the use of descriptive norms to be more
effective than the invocation of environmental benefits in bringing about towel re-use).
184. See Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 116, at 1705. For example, an
“Individual Carbon-Release Inventory” might disclose data on carbon emissions from
individuals and suggest behavioral changes with the goal of reducing carbon emissions. Id.
at 1729–32.
185. See Kevin Burchell, Ruth Rettie & Kavita Patel, Marketing Social Norms: Social
Marketing and the ‘Social Norm Approach’, 12 J. CONSUMER BEHAV. 1, 5–6 (2013) (using
descriptive norms “exploit[s] the fact that people tend to conform [their behavior] to what
they understand to be the norm”); Vandenbergh et al., supra note 178, at 752–54 (offering
examples of groups effectively using descriptive norms to change individuals’ behavior).
186. See P. Wesley Schultz et al., The Constructive, Destructive, and Reconstructive
Power of Social Norms, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 429, 430 (2007).
187. See Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 116, at 1709, 1729–31; see also Schultz
et al., supra note 186, at 430, 432–33 (finding that combining descriptive information with
an injunctive message reduced the tendency of descriptive norms to inadvertently increase
levels of undesirable behavior among those who already abstain from such behavior).
188. See Philip K. Lehman & E. Scott Geller, Behavior Analysis and Environmental
Protection: Accomplishments and Potential for More, 13 BEHAV. & SOC. ISSUES 13, 18
(2004) (“[I]nformation alone is seldom sufficient to change behavior.”); Doug McKenzieMohr, Promoting Sustainable Behavior: An Introduction to Community-Based Social
Marketing, 56 J. SOC. ISSUES 543, 547 (2000) (noting importance of identifying barriers to
a desired behavior and explaining that these “barriers . . . may be internal . . . or external”).
189. See Vandenbergh et al., supra note 178, at 754–55; see also DOUG MCKENZIEMOHR, FOSTERING SUSTAINABLE BEHAVIOR: AN INTRODUCTION TO COMMUNITYBASED SOCIAL MARKETING 41–127 (3d ed. 2011) (offering various strategies to enhance
social marketing).
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limitations of rational choice theory in predicting behavior.190 These
tools include incentives, behavioral nudges—which seek to change
people’s behavior “without forbidding any options or significantly
changing their economic incentives”191—and other measures that
lower the economic, social, or psychological costs of behavioral
change.192 Asking individuals to make a commitment based on their
beliefs, and subsequently reminding them of that commitment, can
change behavior, particularly if the commitment is public and in
writing.193 Similarly, frequent feedback can be an effective tool for
influencing ongoing behavior.194 Such feedback might encourage
individuals to engage in environmentally positive behaviors by
quantifying such behaviors or describing their effect on the
environment.195
6. Technological Management
Technological management offers yet another approach to
governing individual behavior. Technological management refers to
“the design of products or places, or the automation of processes . . .
seek[ing] to exclude . . . the possibility of certain actions.”196 Strictly
speaking, technological management is not a legal tool. However,
technological management functions like law by steering conduct in a
desired direction or making certain conduct practically or physically
impossible. Technological management of individual behavior
typically occurs at the design or engineering stage. For example,
190. See Vandenbergh et al., supra note 178, at 716–17; see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
The Psychological Foundations of Behavioral Law and Economics, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV.
1675, 1675 (noting that behavioral law and economics recognizes “that human behavior
commonly deviates from predictions of rational choice theory”).
191. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 6 (2008); see also Pierre Schlag, Nudge,
Choice Architecture, and Libertarian Paternalism, 108 MICH. L. REV. 913, 915–16 (2010)
(discussing default rules, “priming,” and other examples of behavioral nudges).
192. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 191, at 6–8; see also McKenzie-Mohr, supra
note 188, at 548 (listing a variety of tools policymakers can use to create effective social
marketing campaigns).
193. See MCKENZIE-MOHR, supra note 189, at 45–56; Lehman & Geller, supra note
188, at 20; Vandenbergh et al., supra note 178, at 759. Commitment strategies can require
significant investments of resources to engage individuals, however. See MCKENZIEMOHR, supra note 189, at 54; McKenzie-Mohr, supra note 188, at 546–57. A less laborintensive strategy is to prompt individuals with oral or written messages stating desired
behaviors. Lehman & Geller, supra note 188, at 19; see also MCKENZIE-MOHR, supra note
189, at 83–87 (discussing the mechanics and examples of effective prompting).
194. Lehman & Geller, supra note 188, at 21–22; van den Bergh, supra note 148, at 568.
195. See Lehman & Geller, supra note 188, at 21–22.
196. Roger Brownsword, In the Year 2061: From Law to Technological Management, 7
L. INNOVATION & TECH. 1, 8 (2015).
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traffic engineers may narrow roads to reduce vehicle speeds and
traffic volume,197 and manufacturers may include automatic shut-off
features in appliances to reduce energy use.198 Software code serves as
a form of technological management as well, regulating
communications and interactions in cyberspace.199 In other cases,
technological management may substitute directly for law, as
illustrated by the potential for self-driving cars to make many
highway safety laws superfluous.200 As the “Internet of Things”—the
networking of physical devices to send and receive data—expands,201
technological management will play an increasingly prominent role in
governing individual behavior.202
Technological management does not involve the same level of
coercion as direct prohibition. Whereas a prohibition identifies what
is not allowed and to whom the prohibition applies, technological
management is more subtle. Such an approach may obscure the
existence of regulation and its extent, and perhaps the identity of the
regulator as well.203 These features may make technological
management more politically feasible than direct regulation but also
may raise concerns regarding political accountability and individual
autonomy.204
C.

Governance of Small-Scale Activities in Developing Countries

The challenge of regulating individual behavior is not confined to
developed countries. In developing countries, small-scale actors are
responsible for an especially large share of environmental harms. The
challenge of regulating these small-scale activities is analogous to that
posed by distributed innovation: numerous and widespread
regulatory targets, limited government capacity to regulate directly,
lack of awareness regarding environmental problems, and political
197. Reid Ewing & Eric Dumbaugh, The Built Environment and Traffic Safety: A
Review of Empirical Evidence, 23 J. PLAN. LITERATURE 347, 355–56, 363 (2009).
198. Brownsword, supra note 196, at 24–25 (detailing potential product features that
could control energy use and vehicle speed).
199. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 56–57, 72 (2006) (explaining the
means by which software development and code can be used to regulate network users).
200. Brownsword, supra note 196, at 48.
201. See JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., DISRUPTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES 4–6 (2013), https://www.sommetinter.coop/sites/default/files/etude/files
/report_mckinsey_technology_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/28UK-Y393].
202. See Brownsword, supra note 196, at 7 (“[T]echnological management promises to
be the strategy of choice for public regulators of the present century.” (footnote omitted)).
203. See id. at 16; see also LESSIG, supra note 199, at 138 (“Code-based regulation . . .
risks making regulation invisible.”).
204. See Brownsword, supra note 196, at 9–10.
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resistance.205 To be sure, small-scale activities in developing countries
have distinctive features—environmentally sloppy practices may be
driven by poverty, and regulatory institutions may be especially weak
or poorly supported206—but experience in managing these activities
may nevertheless be instructive in managing distributed innovation.
Addressing environmental problems caused by small-scale
industrial activity in developing countries often involves the
promotion of “cleaner production”—instilling less wasteful and more
energy-efficient production processes that offer economic benefits for
the target actor as well as safety and environmental benefits.207
Barriers to adopting cleaner production methods may be attitudinal,
organizational, technical, and economic.208
One example of a small-scale activity with significant health and
environmental impacts is the small-scale mining activity conducted by
millions of people in developing countries. Small-scale mining
operations often take place with minimal environmental safeguards
because of financial limitations and a lack of information and
oversight.209 Miners are often subject to toxic chemicals and
dangerous work environments, and their operations contribute to
mercury contamination, erosion, deforestation, and other forms of
environmental degradation.210 Strategies for preventing and
addressing such impacts include: adopting a licensing system tailored
to small-scale operations; offering training and other educational
initiatives; establishing formal organizations or regional centers to
provide support and training; developing partnerships with large
mining organizations to disseminate best practices; registering smallscale operators with large-scale companies on whose properties they
operate; and providing better ore-processing equipment.211
205. See Philip Andrews-Speed et al., The Regulation of China’s Township and Village
Coal Mines: A Study of Complexity and Ineffectiveness, 11 J. CLEANER PRODUCTION 185,
185 (2003); Jos Frijns & Bas van Vliet, Small-Scale Industry and Cleaner Production
Strategies, 27 WORLD DEV. 967, 971 (1999).
206. See, e.g., Oliver Maponga & Clay F. Ngorima, Overcoming Environmental
Problems in the Gold Panning Sector Through Legislation and Education: the Zimbabwean
Experience, 11 J. CLEANER PRODUCTION 147, 155 (2003).
207. See Frijns & van Vliet, supra note 205, at 975.
208. See id. at 977–78.
209. See Benjamin N.A. Aryee, Bernard K. Ntibery & Evans Atorkui, Trends in the
Small-Scale Mining of Precious Minerals in Ghana: A Perspective on Its Environmental
Impact, 11 J. CLEANER PRODUCTION 131, 136 (2003).
210. See Gavin Hilson, Small-Scale Mining and Its Socio-Economic Impact in
Developing Countries, 26 NAT. RESOURCES F. 3, 8–9 (2002).
211. See Aryee et al., supra note 209, at 137–39; Hilson, supra note 210, at 9–11;
Wilfred C. Lombe, Editorial, Small Scale Mining and the Environment: Bloom Beyond the
Doom and Gloom?, 11 J. CLEANER PRODUCTION 95, 96 (2003). Furthermore, the
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What these strategies have in common is a “soft law” touch—
they shy away from complex regulation, strive to educate rather than
coerce, and devolve power away from central government to local or
private entities. A similar approach might also be effective in
distributed-innovation contexts involving numerous actors who have
limited information and resources.
IV. GOVERNING DISTRIBUTED INNOVATION
Having reviewed various approaches for governing individual or
small-scale behavior, we return to the challenge of governing
distributed innovation. While some of the approaches for governing
small-scale behavior offer useful suggestions, distributed innovation
poses distinct difficulties for oversight. This Part discusses these
difficulties and suggests three categories of options for distributedinnovation governance: (1) a “Big Data/Big Government” approach;
(2) an approach that relies on nongovernmental intermediaries for
oversight; and (3) a self-regulatory approach.
A. The Further Complexity of Governing Distributed Innovation
The regulatory challenge presented by distributed innovation has
much in common with the challenge posed by pollution from smallscale sources. Both grapple with the difficulty of governing the
conduct of parties that are numerous, unaccustomed to regulation,
and largely outside the regulatory system.
As compared with other forms of small-scale activity, distributed
innovation possesses several characteristics that make governance
especially complex. First, the effects of distributed innovation may be
particularly uncertain because the activities at issue are new and
constantly changing. A new activity may be easier to shape. The
uncertainty of a new activity’s effects, however, may make it
impossible for a government to determine if regulation is necessary in
the first instance. Further, if a government does decide to regulate,
some tools, such as information dissemination or specific permits,
may be difficult to deploy effectively in the absence of accurate
information. Second, distributed innovation confronts would-be
regulators with moving targets. The innovation process is inherently
dynamic. Consequently, setting up a permit system or other
regulatory scheme predicated on current types, levels, and impacts of
establishment of secure property rights to mineral land can provide an incentive to invest
in knowledge and physical capital. See Knud Sinding, The Dynamics of Artisanal and
Small-Scale Mining Reform, 29 NAT. RESOURCES F. 243, 244, 247, 251 (2005).
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activity may not work. Third, the potential for catastrophic harms—as
in the case of DIYbio212—suggests a small margin for regulatory error.
For ordinary small-scale behaviors with cumulatively significant
impacts, less-than-complete regulatory coverage and compliance may
not prevent achievement of regulatory goals. In contrast, the failure
to regulate a particular distributed innovator—for example, a DIY
biologist engaging in the release of experimental organisms—may
matter in ways that the failure to regulate a small-scale polluter may
not.
The distinctive characteristics of distributed innovation make it
difficult to directly transplant techniques used to govern small-scale
behavior in other contexts. Such techniques may be useful starting
points for managing the risks of distributed innovation, but
policymakers should conduct a context-specific analysis before
choosing a particular course. Indeed, the distinctive features of
distributed innovation—change, novelty, and potential for
catastrophe—are among the qualities that have prompted scholars to
turn from conventional regulation to the broader and more flexible
notion
of
governance.213
Governance—the
making
and
implementation of norms by public actors as well as businesses,
nonprofit organizations, and other private actors214—offers a more
sophisticated approach for responding to economic and social
conditions that are often too complex, uncertain, volatile, and
heterogeneous to be managed through conventional regulatory
approaches.215 Examples of governance by private actors include
accreditation and certification schemes, third-party monitoring and
verification, and voluntary codes of conduct.216 Governance by private
actors can bring additional societal resources to address problems and
attract the support of key stakeholders.217 Private involvement,
however, can also raise concerns regarding accountability and
legitimacy.218
212. See supra notes 25–34 and accompanying text.
213. See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 357–58 (2004).
214. See id. at 344; see also Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New Governance” in Legal
Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN.
L. REV. 471, 474 (2004).
215. See Lobel, supra note 213, at 357–58.
216. See id. at 374–75; Lesley K. McAllister, Regulation by Third-Party Verification, 53
B.C. L. REV. 1, 2–4 (2012).
217. See Lester M. Salamon, The Tools Approach and the New Governance:
Conclusion and Implications, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW
GOVERNANCE 600, 602–03 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002).
218. See id. at 602–05.
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The concept of governance is consistent with Larry Lessig’s
identification of law as just one of four possible “modalities of
regulation.”219 Other modalities of regulation, according to Lessig,
include: social norms, which communities, rather than governments,
enforce; markets, which “regulate by price”; and architecture, which
regulates by physically or virtually constraining an activity.220 These
different modalities may operate simultaneously in an environment,
interacting with and influencing each other.221
In choosing from among these modalities or from among
governance options, policymakers might consider criteria such as
effectiveness, efficiency, equity, manageability, adaptability, political
feasibility, and legitimacy.222 The objective here, however, is not to
assess the ultimate desirability of any specific policy instrument
according to these criteria. Rather, the criteria are presented as a
starting point for government or nongovernmental entities as they
consider options for addressing the risks of distributed innovation.223
The importance of each factor will depend on context and on the
priorities of decision makers and stakeholders.224 Effectiveness may
be critical when a program is designed to address very serious or

219. Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 501, 507 (1999).
220. Id. at 507–08. Architecture includes the earlier discussed tool of technological
management, which “responds to a perceived risk by either removing humans from the
activity in question or by designing products, places, and even people in ways that exclude
the risky act.” Brownsword, supra note 196, at 10.
221. See Lessig, supra note 219, at 511–12.
222. See Peter Bohm & Clifford S. Russell, Comparative Analysis of Alternative Policy
Instruments, in 1 HANDBOOK OF NATURAL RESOURCE & ENERGY ECONOMICS 395,
399–401 (Allen V. Kneese & James L. Sweeney eds., 1985) (identifying “[d]imensions for
judging environmental policy instruments”); Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance
and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1611, 1647–50
(2001) (discussing criteria for assessing policy interventions); see also Robert W. Hahn &
Robert N. Stavins, Economic Incentives for Environmental Protection: Integrating Theory
and Practice, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 464, 464 (1992) (discussing potential criteria for
analyzing policy).
223. As Sarah Light and Eric Orts have suggested in the context of global
environmental governance, “there is no omniscient single ‘chooser’ of options”; rather,
“there are many ‘choosers’: governments (at multiple levels), private business firms,
NGOs, and individuals acting as both consumers and citizens.” Sarah E. Light & Eric W.
Orts, Parallels in Public and Private Environmental Governance, 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. &
ADMIN. L. 1, 10–11 (2015).
224. See Robert M. Friedman, Donna Downing & Elizabeth M. Gunn, Environmental
Policy Instrument Choice: The Challenge of Competing Goals, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y F. 327, 327–28 (2000); see also Light & Orts, supra note 223, at 11 (“The
appropriate governance solution for a particular problem will depend upon the specific
context of a problem, available alternative tools, and a weighing of different normative
considerations.”).
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catastrophic risks,225 for example, whereas adaptability may receive
special consideration when governance is at an early stage.
B.

Three Basic Approaches

As the earlier discussion suggests, the policy literature offers a
range of tools that could assist in the oversight of distributed
innovation. Ultimately, these tools fall into three categories: (1) a
“Big Data/Big Government” approach that takes advantage of Big
Data advances to apply existing law or develop new regulatory
programs; (2) an approach that relies heavily on nongovernmental
intermediaries to serve as the frontline or primary means of oversight;
and (3) a self-regulatory approach in which persons engaged in
distributed innovation take on substantial responsibility for
overseeing themselves.
This typology and Lessig’s categorization of regulatory
modalities226 do overlap in some ways: just as norms, markets, and
architecture
offer
alternative
modalities
of
regulation,
nongovernmental intermediaries and private actors can substitute for
government regulators. Lessig’s approach, however, is especially
concerned with the means of regulation and focuses on architecture
as an often-overlooked method.227 In contrast, the typology presented
here zeroes in on the actor responsible for a constraint rather than the
nature of the constraint. A primary focus on who does the governing,
with a secondary focus on how the governing should be done, is
appropriate because it prompts an inquiry into whether the entity is
capable, accountable, and democratically responsible. Distributed
innovation calls into question government’s ability to respond, and
thus the question of “Who else might govern?” is a critical one. The
challenge involves a matter of not only picking a different tool from
the regulatory toolbox but also re-conceptualizing oversight and
identifying alternative agents of governance.
1. Big Data/Big Government
The “Big Data/Big Government” response to distributed
innovation would capitalize on the huge quantities of data being

225. See Friedman et al., supra note 224, at 345.
226. See supra notes 219–21 and accompanying text.
227. See Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, Demystifying Lessig, 2008 WISC. L. REV. 713,
716–17. For further discussion of what Lessig means by “architecture,” see supra note 220
and accompanying text.
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produced and the growing capacity to collect and process it.228 In
some areas, the same technologies that make distributed innovation
possible also would facilitate government tracking and anticipation of
distributed-innovation activities. For example, the digital advances
that make the sharing economy possible also allow activities within
that economy to be monitored, analyzed, and overseen. Where data
collection is routine, one can readily imagine a regulatory scheme
relying on that data. Government might then adapt existing
regulations to account for the unique aspects of the new, innovative
activity.229
The specific steps government might take under a Big Data/Big
Government approach will depend on a community’s values and the
weighing of relevant tradeoffs.230 One relatively light-handed option
would be to require general permits of small-scale operators rather
than more onerous individual permits.231 Such an approach could hold
operators to minimal standards while providing data to help
regulators decide if more oversight is needed. Another option would
be to use performance-based regulations, which would set regulatory
standards but allow regulated entities flexibility in how they achieve
specified results.232 Government could also undertake more
comprehensive reform: rather than merely modifying existing
schemes to account for distributed innovation’s unique features,

228. I use the term “Big Data” to refer generally to the collection, analysis, and use of
large data sets as the basis for corporate or governmental decision-making. Various
definitions of the term focus on the use of supercomputers to find patterns and generate
predictions based on data or on the “high-volume, high-velocity, and high-variety”
features of data. See, e.g., Margaret Hu, Small Data Surveillance v. Big Data
Cybersurveillance, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 773, 794–97 (2015).
229. See Lobel, supra note 65, at 129–30 (noting the need for data analysis when
governments craft regulations for Airbnb); see also JANELLE ORSI ET AL., SHAREABLE &
SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES L. CTR., POLICIES FOR SHAREABLE CITIES: A SHARING
ECONOMY POLICY PRIMER FOR URBAN LEADERS 15–16, 18–19, 21 (2013),
https://www.shareable.net/blog/new-report-policies-for-shareable-cities [https://perma.cc
/6SHA-4NQY] (providing examples of local governments adapting existing policies or
adopting new policies to incentivize innovations in urban farming and cottage food
industries).
230. See Lobel, supra note 65, at 129–30.
231. See supra Section III.B.3; see also Biber & Ruhl, supra note 91, at 232–33
(suggesting the use of general permits for regulating sharing economy activity); Eric Biber
& J.B. Ruhl, Regulating the “Sharing Economy,” REGULATORY REV. (July 28, 2014),
http://www.regblog.org/2014/07/28/28-biber-ruhl-regulating-the-sharing-economy/
[https://perma.cc/QZ62-Y9KT].
232. See JOHAL & ZON, supra note 82, at 24 (arguing that performance-based
regulations would more effectively regulate the sharing economy than command-andcontrol policies).
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government might view distributed-innovation activity as an
opportunity to modernize overall regulatory policies.233
Adoption of a Big Data/Big Government regulatory approach
may require government intrusion into activity that in some instances
is considered personal or proprietary. Consequently, Big Data/Big
Government approaches raise concerns regarding transparency,
autonomy, and protection of privacy.234 Big Data collects data
through opaque techniques, and the institutions that use the data hold
tremendous power.235 Furthermore, technology concealing users’
identities may in some instances confound Big Data/Big Government
approaches.236
Notwithstanding such concerns, government likely will play a
significant role in distributed-innovation oversight. Distributed
innovation and any attendant harms will be the subject of intense
public concern. Government possesses substantial resources to make
and enforce the law, and it is authorized generally to represent the
public. In at least some contexts, government will be the most
effective protector of the public and public values, even if it cannot
use conventional regulatory methods.237
2. Nongovernmental Intermediaries
Governance includes a range of “actions taken by nongovernmental entities that are designed to achieve traditionally
governmental ends.”238 These actions may be legally mandated or
purely voluntary. Private environmental governance includes selfregulation, discussed in the next Section, and governance by
nongovernmental intermediaries. Nongovernmental intermediaries
often have information, skills, or resources the government lacks and
may be able to act where jurisdictional gaps or other constraints
233. See Zon, supra note 65, at 5–6 (“[G]overnments should take a step back and use
this transition as an opportunity to revisit what their primary policy objectives are and
whether existing policies are meeting those goals.”).
234. See Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Three Paradoxes of Big Data, 66 STAN.
L. REV. ONLINE 41, 42–45 (2013).
235. See id.
236. See Snow, supra note 1, at 82 (“[I]ntelligence signatures will be reduced by the use
of anonymizing tools and dark networks.”).
237. See Bryant Cannon & Hanna Chung, A Framework for Designing Co-Regulation
Models Well-Adapted to Technology-Facilitated Sharing Economies, 31 SANTA CLARA
HIGH TECH. L.J. 23, 57–58 (2015) (“Firms left unchecked, so the argument goes, will put
their own profits ahead of the public interest, and self-regulatory standards will inevitably
prove too lenient.”).
238. Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L.
REV. 129, 146 (2013).
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prevent government action.239 Unhindered by processes applicable to
government decision-making, these entities may be able to develop
and adapt programs rapidly in response to changing circumstances or
local conditions.240
Examples
of
private
environmental
governance
by
nongovernmental
intermediaries
include
eco-labeling
and
certification systems, lending standards, environmental management
standards, and supply chain contracts.241 Many of these examples
involve large corporations, which can serve as a fulcrum of leverage
over those who depend on them, such as small suppliers.242 But
private governance efforts are not limited to large corporations.
Insurers, banks, certification organizations, industry associations, and
nonprofits are just some of the entities that exercise regulatory
authority over private activity.243 Such entities may monitor and
challenge industry behavior, gather and disseminate information, or
cooperate with industry to establish and implement standards of
conduct.244
Of course, the goals and agendas of nongovernmental entities
may not coincide with the public interest.245 Private entities may adopt
governance measures in an effort to ward off more restrictive public
regulation.246 Nongovernmental intermediaries may be interested
primarily in cultivating more business or burnishing their reputations.
Furthermore, various constitutional and statutory obligations
designed to foster openness, accountability, fairness, and public
participation do not apply to nongovernmental actors.247 To counter
such concerns, nongovernmental entities may disclose information
voluntarily or adopt other quasi-public measures. Active government
239. See id. at 161; see also Paul L. Posner, Accountability Challenges of Third-Party
Governance 2 (June 2004) (unpublished paper prepared for the 20th Anniversary
Structure and Organization of Government Research Committee of the International
Political Science Association), http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/campbell/sog-conf/papers/sog2004posner.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4SW-UHV2].
240. See Posner, supra note 239, at 2.
241. See Vandenbergh, supra note 238, at 148–61.
242. See id. at 168–69.
243. See Salamon, supra note 222, at 1613–14.
244. See Yishai Blank & Issi Rosen-Zvi, The Persistence of the Public/Private Divide in
Environmental Regulation, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 199, 218–19 (2014).
245. See Posner, supra note 239, at 15.
246. See Vandenbergh, supra note 238, at 186–87.
247. See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116
HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1301–02 (2003) (noting a group’s concern “about privatization’s
implications for what they regard as liberal democratic norms of accountability, due
process, equality, rationality, and the like”); Posner, supra note 239, at 7 (“Third party
providers have independent bases of political power . . . .”).
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oversight of nongovernmental intermediaries also can provide a
measure of accountability and bring pressure to align intermediaries’
interests with those of the general public.248
Reliance on nongovernmental intermediaries may be combined
with government regulation. Take, for example, upstream regulation,
in which government directly regulates larger entities that in turn
influence behavior by smaller entities or individuals.249 Upstream
regulation makes particular sense in the case of repeat players, who
not only have greater regulatory sophistication but also face stronger
incentives to correct externalities and comply with regulatory
requirements.250 Unsurprisingly, regulatory efforts in the distributed
innovation context have focused on Uber, Airbnb, and 3D-printer
manufacturers rather than on occasional Uber drivers, Airbnb hosts,
or 3D-printer users.251 These repeat players generally are easier to
track and can adopt precautions against risk at the lowest cost.252
3. Self-Regulation
Government may rely on industry members to regulate
themselves when it lacks sufficient information, political will, or
resources to regulate effectively.253 Compared with government, the
industry or community to be regulated often has superior information
regarding risks and risk-reduction strategies.254 Industry can often
monitor and control its own operations more effectively than

248. See McAllister, supra note 216, at 32–33.
249. See supra Section III.B.4.
250. See Cannon & Chung, supra note 237, at 35 (discussing “incentives gap” between
inexperienced sharing economy actors with little incentive “to self-impose an optimal level
of forethought and safeguards” and platform developers and government regulators with
long-term incentives to correct market inefficiencies).
251. See Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 73, at 922–24 (discussing local government
efforts to regulate “non-professional” services by regulating the sharing economy
platforms).
252. See Katz, supra note 87, at 1101–03 (explaining why sharing platforms, not service
providers, are “either the least-cost avoider or the easiest target for enforcement
agencies”).
253. See Jodi L. Short, Self-Regulation in the Regulatory Void: “Blue Moon” or “Bad
Moon”?, 649 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 22, 27–28 (2013) (identifying
knowledge voids, political voids, and institutional voids as the three types of “regulatory
voids” self-regulation typically is meant to address).
254. See Cannon & Chung, supra note 237, at 32; Douglas C. Michael, Federal Agency
Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a Regulatory Technique, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 181
(1995).
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outsiders.255 And in rapidly changing environments, industry can often
better anticipate developments and more readily adjust standards.256
As with governance through nongovernmental intermediaries,
self-regulation need not be exclusive of other forms of governance.
Self-regulation may be voluntary, formulated in response to the
threat of government regulation, or sanctioned by the government.257
Government might even mandate self-regulation by setting
overarching goals and then allowing industry to determine and
implement standards to achieve those goals.258 Often, self-regulation
is part of a complex regulatory environment in which public and
private actors cooperate in creating and implementing rules.259
Understandably, self-regulation carries some
negative
connotations. The metaphor of the fox guarding the hen house
reflects the serious concerns regarding self-interested behavior, lack
of transparency, and dubious accountability.260 Self-regulation,
however, typically involves more than a company policing itself. The
term often refers to a group of industry peers or a professional
association regulating behavior.261 Indeed, effective self-regulation
may require a network of relationships within an industry.262 Even
then, additional safeguards may be necessary for self-regulation to be
fair and effective. Participation by independent third parties, public
scrutiny, professional norms, and the threat of government regulation

255. Saule T. Omarova, Rethinking the Future of Self-Regulation in the Financial
Industry, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 665, 670 (2010).
256. Cannon & Chung, supra note 237, at 32; see also Michael, supra note 254, at 182,
243 (concluding from a survey that audited self-regulation offers advantages of flexibility
and superior technical expertise).
257. Black, supra note 109, at 118; see also Michael, supra note 254, at 175–77
(distinguishing between voluntary private standard setting and delegation of government
power to nongovernmental entity to implement laws or regulations).
258. See Cannon & Chung, supra note 237, at 55; see also Jody Freeman, The Private
Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 551–52, 644–45 (2000) (describing
“[t]he [p]ervasive [p]rivate [r]ole” in crafting and enforcing regulations and how to
structure “[a]n effective self-regulatory system”).
259. See Omarova, supra note 255, at 675–76 (discussing concept of “co-regulation”).
260. See Black, supra note 109, at 115 (noting a perception that self-regulation “is selfserving, self-interested, lacking in sanctions, beset with free rider problems, and simply a
sham”); Freeman, supra note 258, at 647 (“[S]elf-regulation raises accountability
concerns.”).
261. See Molly Cohen & Arun Sundararajan, Self-Regulation and Innovation in the
Peer-to-Peer Sharing Economy, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 116, 123–25 (2015)
(discussing types and examples of “self-regulatory organizations”).
262. See Freeman, supra note 258, at 644.

96 N.C. L. REV. 945 (2018)

2018]

HERDING CATS

989

all can motivate compliance with self-regulatory approaches and
lessen accountability concerns.263
Oversight of distributed innovation is characterized precisely by
the informational challenges, implementation difficulties, and
changing conditions that make self-regulation an attractive alternative
to conventional governmental regulation. In all likelihood, the very
communities that participate in distributed innovation will be central
to managing distributed innovation’s risks. These groups obviously
influence how a technology develops and what risks arise as they
share information and disseminate a technology.264 But these
communities will also have a more direct role in risk management. To
some extent, these groups police themselves and punish violators of
community norms through a range of techniques, including
reputational sanctions, cyber vigilantism, and denial of access to
community goods.265 These communities can share expert knowledge
with the government and provide insight into the effectiveness of
potential oversight mechanisms.266 Furthermore, distributedinnovation communities can be especially valuable contributors to
risk management efforts because they often are not bound by the
physical, legal, temporal, and geographic constraints that apply to
conventional government oversight.267
V. GOVERNANCE OPTIONS FOR DISTRIBUTED INNOVATION
This Part considers how various governance options are
beginning to appear—or might be further applied—in the specific
contexts of DIYbio, 3D printing, and the sharing economy. Given
distributed innovation’s varied forms and the challenges it poses for
conventional regulation, the variety of governance approaches is
unsurprising. There is no one-size-fits-all solution to the challenges
posed by distributed innovation. Going forward, those engaged in
governance efforts will wrestle with competing objectives of
encouraging innovation, protecting people and the environment, and
safeguarding privacy and democratic values.

263.
26.
264.
265.
266.
267.

See id. at 665–66; Michael, supra note 254, at 192–93; Short, supra note 253, at 24–
See Snow, supra note 1, at 19.
See id. at 48 (discussing examples of self-policing by open-source communities).
See id. at 80.
See id. at 73.
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A. DIYbio
1. The Current Approach: Primarily Self-Regulation
To date, governance of DIYbio has relied heavily on a form of
self-regulation. Community labs have played a critical role in
addressing potential hazards. DIYbio participants in these labs have
formulated ethical principles, and the DIYbio community has
partnered with the FBI to learn about and identify potential threats.
Thus, the current approach relies on norms and architecture rather
than law.
Much—but not all—DIYbio activity takes place in community
labs.268 Community labs generally regulate access and lab materials.269
Lab directors, who might face legal liability should problems arise,
typically “evaluate each new member and their project for safety.”270
Lab directors also approve the introduction and removal of materials
from the lab.271 Further, community labs typically require BSL-1 lab
conditions, which do not allow for work with disease-causing
organisms.272 Persons working in BSL-1 conditions must follow basic
lab safety practices and adhere to established codes of conduct.273
Insurers—a nongovernment intermediary—also play a governance
role by requiring documented adherence to safety rules.274
In a further effort to instill a culture of safety, the DIYbio
community has developed rudimentary ethics codes.275 Participants in
a 2011 conference of DIYbio groups drafted a code that outlines
principles in seven areas, including open access, safety, and the
environment.276 Nevertheless, the principles are rather general and,
without further elaboration, may be too vague to provide concrete
guidance in specific situations. For example, the principle governing
268. See GRUSHKIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 6. Even if DIY biologists do not work
specifically in a community lab, they typically work in “group spaces” instead of in
isolation. See id. at 9 (“92 percent of DIYers work in group spaces. These split between
community labs, group labs solely devoted to biotechnology, and electronics hackerspaces
that house DIYbio labs.”).
269. See id. at 19.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. See id. at 15.
273. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 33, at 30–32
(outlining BSL-1 “standard practices”).
274. See Landrain et al., supra note 5, at 124.
275. GRUSHKIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 14; Draft DIYbio Code of Ethics from North
American Congress, DIY BIO, https://diybio.org/codes/code-of-ethics-north-americacongress-2011/ [https://perma.cc/5RMR-E4JS].
276. Draft DIYbio Code of Ethics from North American Congress, supra note 275.
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safety simply states, “[a]dopt safe practices.”277 Similarly, the principle
governing the environment declares: “Respect the environment.”278
Nonetheless, advisory boards of community labs can expand upon
these principles in specific contexts. A web portal, “Ask a Biosafety
Expert,” is also available to offer advice.279
A partnership with the FBI has enhanced and supplemented the
DIYbio community’s self-regulatory efforts to address biosecurity
risks.280 Mindful of potential biosecurity risks but also worried that a
heavy-handed approach might drive DIYbio activity underground,
the FBI established an outreach program.281 Through the program,
the FBI sought to gain the trust of DIYbio members and to secure
their assistance as potential informants.282 As the FBI’s relationship
with the DIYbio community grew, the FBI convinced the community
that collaboration with the FBI would counter a growing public
mistrust of community lab experiments, while DIY biologists
persuaded the FBI that their community lab activities generally pose
a minimal threat to biosecurity.283 The resulting partnership has
provided the government with access to expertise and assistance in
policing potential threats at a relatively low cost.284
Further consideration of the ability of community labs to govern
DIYbio’s risks is appropriate, given their central role. By analogy,
one might look to more well-established research institutions that
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Ask a Biosafety Professional Your Question, DIYBIO, http://ask.diybio.org/
[https://perma.cc/H9JT-P3B7].
280. See PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note
30, at 146; Tocchetti & Aguiton, supra note 34, at 829, 844.
281. See Tocchetti & Aguiton, supra note 34, at 829.
282. See id.; Kellogg, supra note 9, at 21, 25–26; see also NAT’L SCI. ADVISORY BD.
FOR BIOSECURITY, STRATEGIES TO EDUCATE AMATEUR BIOLOGISTS AND SCIENTISTS
IN NON-LIFE SCIENCE DISCIPLINES ABOUT DUAL USE RESEARCH IN THE LIFE
SCIENCES 1 (2011), https://osp.od.nih.gov/biotechnology/nsabb-reports-and-recommendations/
[https://perma.cc/Y56P-2SN8] (recommending specific education and outreach efforts in
response to observations gathered from “non-traditional audiences” in the life-science
community).
283. See Tocchetti & Aguiton, supra note 34, at 833–45; see also DELFANTI, supra note
17, at 116. The FBI has experienced greater success in establishing relationships with the
American DIYbio community than with the European DIYbio community, who have
been wary of the FBI’s overtures. See Howard Wolinsky, The FBI and Biohackers: An
Unusual Relationship, 17 EMBO REPS. 793, 793–95 (2016), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com
/doi/10.15252/embr.201642483/full [https://perma.cc/HB5U-D78S (dark archive)].
284. See Snow, supra note 1, at 64–65; see also Tocchetti & Aguiton, supra note 34, at
843 (concluding that collaboration has expanded “[t]he biosecurity apparatus . . . from the
sphere of state, military, and corporations to reach out to individuals and nonstate actors
(i.e., graduate and postgraduate students, dropouts, members of the civil society, and
disenfranchised scientists)”).
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perform similar oversight functions for professional scientists.
Unfortunately, oversight by such institutions raises concerns
regarding whether professional scientists—let alone DIY biologists—
operate with adequate safeguards. University and corporate research
institutions have lab rules, local oversight committees, and other
mechanisms to foster responsible practices and address potential
risks.285 However, even these institutions sometimes lack the
expertise, independence, and authority to regulate effectively.286
Deficiencies in preparedness, training, and adherence to safety
protocols periodically contribute to serious accidents in these
institutional settings.287 Indeed, a 2014 National Academy of Sciences
report noted that some researchers view safety practices “as a barrier
to research progress and a violation of their academic freedom.”288 It
would not be surprising for such views also to exist within the DIYbio
community, which espouses as a core value the freedom to
experiment outside of traditional research settings.289
In response to such concerns, DIY biologists point to a culture of
openness and responsibility. Codes of conduct and community-based
oversight can help guard against mishaps and deliberate misuse of the
technology.290 Further, the FBI’s outreach program enables some
monitoring of DIYbio’s biosecurity risks, though perhaps not its
ecological risks.291 Nonetheless, the self-identification of many
DIYbio practitioners as “biohackers”292 suggests the difficulty of
effective control through such efforts. Hacker culture, though
heterogeneous and dynamic, is generally characterized as having a
“communal ethos . . . with values such as free sharing of information
285. See PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note
30, at 143, 146.
286. See Megan J. Palmer, Francis Fukuyama & David A. Relman, A More Systematic
Approach to Biological Risk, 350 SCI. 1471, 1472 (2015).
287. See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., SAFE SCIENCE: PROMOTING A CULTURE OF SAFETY
IN ACADEMIC CHEMICAL RESEARCH 9, 15 (2014) (discussing chemical laboratory
accidents that have occurred in institutional settings); see also CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 33, at 6 (noting that laboratory-associated
infections from exposure to biological agents are infrequent but continue to occur).
288. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., supra note 287, at 3.
289. See Kellogg, supra note 9, at 21 (emphasizing the importance of freedom for
amateur scientists and hobbyists hoping to make breakthroughs in non-traditional
research settings).
290. See supra notes 268–79 and accompanying text.
291. See Kellogg, supra note 9, at 26 (quoting FBI policy and a program specialist’s
characterization of the FBI’s mission as protecting the DIYbio community from
exploitation and enabling community to proceed with research).
292. See DELFANTI, supra note 17, at 111, 117; MARCUS WOHLSEN, BIOPUNK: DIY
SCIENTISTS HACK THE SOFTWARE OF LIFE 5 (2011).
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and knowledge, and peer recognition.”293 In general, these features
could enable codes of conduct to work.294 Yet also prominent in
hacker culture are distrust of authority, rebellion against established
institutions, and opposition to code restrictions.295 Any form of
external oversight—whether through government regulation,
community lab rules, or codes of conduct—may be viewed as contrary
to the hacker ethos. Nor are such attitudes limited to DIY biologists
tinkering with lab experiments. Bio-artists, who use DIYbio to create
living works of art, may similarly oppose rules and instead seek fame,
or notoriety, through shocking creations.296
DIYbio’s antiestablishment approach is expressed primarily “as
a challenge to BigBio—the ensemble of big corporations, global
universities and international and government agencies that compose
the economic system of current life sciences.”297 But the same attitude
could be turned against the DIYbio community itself, which one
biohacker has described as “hierarchical and exclusive.”298 Moreover,
the hacker culture embraces widespread participation and the
unencumbered pursuit of research.299 In the context of DIYbio,
anyone with the desire and enthusiasm to tinker with DNA is invited
to engage in experimentation, to “just do it”—no PhD, peer-review
process, or expert committee oversight required.300

293. DELFANTI, supra note 17, at 56.
294. See id.; WOHLSEN, supra note 292, at 80–81; see also STEVEN LEVY, HACKERS:
HEROES OF THE COMPUTER REVOLUTION 26–36 (1984) (describing principles of the
“Hacker Ethic”).
295. See DELFANTI, supra note 17, at 60, 64; Gabriela A. Sanchez Barba, We Are
Biohackers: Exploring the Collective Identity of the DIYbio Movement, at 41 (Aug. 2014)
(unpublished M.S. thesis, University of Geneva), https://www.researchgate.net/publication
/284727537_We_are_Biohackers_Exploring_the_Collective_Identity_of_the_DIYbio_Movement
[https://perma.cc/553Y-7UHU (staff-uploaded archive)] (“Biohackers . . . strongly object
to imposed requirements and restrictions of any kind that may exclude people from access
and participation or infringe on their freedom of inquiry”).
296. See WOHLSEN, supra note 292, at 201–02; Charo & Greely, supra note 20, at 13
(explaining the potential unlimited bounds of bio-art and the tendencies of such artists “to
achieve fame through sometimes shocking transgressions”).
297. See DELFANTI, supra note 17, at 4.
298. Steph Yin, Is DIY Kitchen CRISPR a Class Issue?, POPULAR SCI. (May 3, 2016),
http://www.popsci.com/is-bringing-crispr-to-kitchens-class-issue [perma.cc/S8X8-NXLM]
(quoting Josiah Zayner, who is offering do-it-yourself CRISPR kits for sale to home
hobbyists).
299. See DELFANTI, supra note 17, at 4, 118 (“Hackers do not always like the
sunlight.”).
300. See Ana Delgado, DIYbio: Making Things and Making Futures, 48 FUTURES 65,
65, 69 (2013); Sanchez Barba, supra note 295, at 35, 41 (reporting comment that “in
DIYbio no one has to justify things in terms of profits or generating new knowledge, ‘you
can explore things just for fun’”).
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As the technology becomes cheaper and easier to use, DIYbio is
unlikely to remain confined in community labs. Already, one DIY
biologist is marketing a $120 gene modification kit for home use that
incorporates the powerful CRISPR gene-editing technology.301 While
its applications are limited, the kit foreshadows potential future
developments.302 Moreover, as even codes of conduct advocates
concede, “community norms will have little effect on the behaviour of
rogue individuals who are intent on causing mischief or harm.”303
Community lab oversight and other forms of self-regulation may
be especially deficient in addressing ecological concerns. Inherent in
DIYbio is a quest to improve upon nature.304 Further, as noted above,
DIYbio promotes experimentation outside of conventional
constraints. In this cultural context, DIY biologists might well pass
over ecological concerns, notwithstanding the code of conduct’s
admonition to “respect the environment.”305 The developers of the
Glowing Plant project made statements exemplifying this casual
attitude towards the natural environment. Without consulting any
ecologists, the developers declared that widespread release of the
engineered plants would cause no environmental harm.306 And in
response to an interview query regarding the desirability of a
completely bioengineered world, one co-developer simply remarked
that the world is already engineered.307 Such sentiments suggest the
limitations of a community lab-centered approach and the need to
consider additional means of governance.

301. See Lisa M. Krieger, Bay Area Biologist’s Gene-Editing Kit Lets Do-It-Yourselfers
Play God at the Kitchen Table, MERCURY NEWS (Jan. 11, 2016),
https://www.mercurynews.com/2016/01/11/bay-area-biologists-gene-editing-kit-lets-do-ityourselfers-play-god-at-the-kitchen-table/ [https://perma.cc/25T5-KYDL]. For further
discussion of CRISPR, see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
302. See Krieger, supra note 301.
303. Kuiken, supra note 16, at 168.
304. See Sanchez Barba, supra note 295, at 2 (discussing the emergence of the DIYbio
movement and the various roles that the movement seeks to play in the fields of life
science and technology).
305. Draft DIYbio Code of Ethics from North American Congress, supra note 275.
306. See Jozef Keulartz & Henk van den Belt, DIY-Bio—Economic, Epistemological
and Ethical Implications and Ambivalences, LIFE SCI. SOC’Y & POL’Y, May 2016, at 1, 14.
307. See id.; cf. Snow, supra note 1, at 36 (reporting that a biohacker working on
genetically modifying plants to survive increased radiation commented: “My plan is to
make it first and ask questions later.”).

96 N.C. L. REV. 945 (2018)

2018]

HERDING CATS

995

2. Applying Big Data/Big Government and Nongovernment
Intermediary Approaches to DIYbio
At first glance, applying a Big Data/Big Government approach to
DIYbio would seem daunting. Overseeing DIYbio research activity is
inherently more difficult than overseeing research in universities,
corporate laboratories, and other institutions.308 The prospect of
keeping genetic material secure in a limited number of controlled
environments, while plausible in the past, appears no longer feasible
in light of technological advances.309 The FBI has avoided an
aggressive law-and-order approach in order to avoid driving DIYbio
activity underground,310 and no obvious technology exists to detect
whether someone is engaging in DIYbio within the confines of his or
her own home.
Nonetheless, a Big Data/Big Government approach may be
practicable. Such an approach may include, for example, mandates
for biosafety training or personal liability insurance or a requirement
that DIY biologists register with the government.311 Creating a
registry for DIY biologists would be a sensible first step.312 A registry
would gather information regarding who is engaging in DIYbio and
how they are engaging in it while imposing limited burdens on DIY
biologists and the government. A registration requirement could be
enforced by prohibiting suppliers from selling CRISPR kits and other
genetic material to unregistered persons.313 Having additional
information about ongoing DIYbio activity would enable better
assessment of potential risks and the need to develop further
measures.
Such a registry might resemble the Federal Aviation
Administration (“FAA”) registry for small unmanned aircraft (i.e.,
drones).314 In response to a congressional mandate to integrate
unmanned aircraft into the national airspace system,315 the FAA
developed registration requirements to enable rapid identification of

308. See Greely, supra note 15.
309. See Palmer et al., supra note 286, at 1471.
310. See Tocchetti & Aguiton, supra note 34, at 834–36.
311. See Kellogg, supra note 9, at 26 (noting various proposals for a more direct
regulatory approach for DIYbio).
312. See E-mail from Hank Greely, Professor of Law, Stanford Law Sch., to author
(May 27, 2016) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
313. See id.
314. Hank Greely suggested this analogy. Id.
315. See FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 332, 126
Stat. 11, 73 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2015)).
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drones and to educate drone owners on safety requirements.316
Concluding that the paper-based registration requirements generally
applicable to aircraft owners would be too onerous if applied to small
drone operators, the FAA developed a streamlined, web-based
registration process specific to small unmanned aircraft owners.317
Any person who owns an unmanned aircraft between fifty-five
hundredths of a pound and fifty-five pounds must comply with
registration requirements.318 Registered owners are assigned a
registration number, which must be marked on all aircraft,319 and
must provide proof of registration if requested by law enforcement or
the FAA.320 Owners are not required to take a test or otherwise prove
they know how to operate a drone, however.321
Experience with drone registration to date suggests that
enforcing an analogous registration requirement for DIYbio would
face significant challenges. Notwithstanding the threat of substantial
civil or criminal penalties for noncompliance, hundreds of thousands
of drone owners apparently missed the registration deadline.322 The
FAA has encouraged state and local law enforcement agencies to

316. Registration and Marking Requirements for Small Unmanned Aircraft, 80 Fed.
Reg. 78,594, 78,594–95 (Dec. 16, 2015) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 48); see also
Interpretation of the Special Rule for Model Aircraft, 79 Fed. Reg. 36,172, 36,172 (June
25, 2014) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 91) (clarifying the FAA’s authority to regulate
unmanned model aircraft that endanger safety of national airspace).
317. Registration and Marking Requirements for Small Unmanned Aircraft, 80 Fed.
Reg. at 78,595.
318. 14 C.F.R. § 48.15 (2017); Registration and Marking Requirements for Small
Unmanned Aircraft, 80 Fed. Reg. at 78,594–95. Unmanned aircraft exceeding fifty-five
pounds are subject to more extensive registration requirements. See Beyond the Basics,
FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/uas/beyond_the_basics/#55 (last modified
Nov. 24, 2017, 4:16 PM) [https://perma.cc/43RB-VCMY] (“To fly a [unmanned aircraft]
that weighs 55 lbs. or more, operators will need to use the existing Section 333 exemption
process . . . .”).
319. 14 C.F.R. § 48.200.
320. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., LAW ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE FOR SUSPECTED
UNAUTHORIZED UAS OPERATIONS 5 (2017), https://www.faa.gov/uas/resources/law
_enforcement/media/FAA_UAS-PO_LEA_Guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/J78J-ER97].
321. See Jacob Pramuk, Why Registry May Not Make Drones Much Safer, CNBC (Jan.
20, 2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/01/20/faa-drone-registry-may-not-be-enough.html
[https://perma.cc/CNU2-NEEP].
322. See Jacob Pramuk, Unregistered Drone Users May Face Jail Time, CNBC (Feb. 23,
2016), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/02/23/unregistered-drone-users-may-face-jail-time.html
[https://perma.cc/CL8C-4EJF]. The FAA warns that it may take enforcement action in the
form of warning notices, letters of correction, or civil penalties “against anyone who
conducts an unauthorized [drone] operation.” FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 320, at
5.
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assist in detecting and enforcing against unauthorized drone
operations,323 but these agencies’ resources are limited.
For DIYbio, a possible locus for enforcing a registration
requirement is DNA synthesis companies, which could limit sales to
registered persons.324 Such an approach would combine a Big
Data/Big Government approach with reliance on nongovernmental
intermediaries. The federal government already encourages DNA
synthesis companies to screen customers to confirm their identity and
to screen gene sequences against a limited database of toxins and
dangerous biological agents.325 The viability of enforcing registration
requirements through DNA synthesis companies assumes limited
access to DNA synthesizers, however. Such an assumption is
increasingly questionable in an era when DIY biologists can order
custom DNA sequences on the internet or buy their own desktop
DNA synthesizers.326
Community labs also could insist on registration as a condition of
access. The FBI’s outreach efforts already have laid a foundation for
further collaboration with the DIYbio community. Community labs
generally have expressed a desire to demonstrate to the public that
they are operating safely,327 so they might volunteer to enforce a
registration requirement. Although enforcement through community
labs would not reach lone-wolf experimenters, it could play an
important role in registering most DIY biologists.
Another possible enforcement locus is the United States Patent
and Trademark Office, which could require DIYbio patent applicants

323. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 320, at 5–7.
324. See E-mail from Hank Greely, supra note 312; see also Michele S. Garfinkel et al.,
Synthetic Genomics: Options for Governance, 3 INDUS. BIOTECHNOLOGY 333, 346–47
(2007) (discussing various options for DNA synthesis firms to act as a potential
intervention point in screening DNA orders from end users prior to synthesis).
325. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., SCREENING FRAMEWORK GUIDANCE
FOR PROVIDERS OF SYNTHETIC DOUBLE-STRANDED DNA 4 (2010); see also Ali Nouri &
Christopher F. Chyba, DNA Synthesis Security, in GENE SYNTHESIS: METHODS AND
PROTOCOLS 285, 290–91 (Jean Peccoud ed., 2012) (discussing potential future safeguards
such as “built-in software or hardware that screens DNA sequence inputs and compares
them to the sequences of pathogens and toxins of concern”). See generally Jonathan B.
Tucker, Double-Edged DNA: Preventing the Misuse of Gene Synthesis, 26 ISSUES SCI. &
TECH. 23 (2010) (recounting the historical development of industry self-regulation and
government guidelines for screening by DNA synthesis companies).
326. See Nouri & Chyba, supra note 325, at 289 (noting potential for “diffusion of
advanced synthesizers—those capable of constructing large DNA molecules—to
individual users around the world”); see also Michele Garfinkle & Lori Knowles, Synthetic
Biology, Biosecurity, and Biosafety, in ETHICS AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 533, 534
(Ronald L. Sandler ed., 2014).
327. See Tocchetti & Aguiton, supra note 34, at 834, 844.
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to prove they have fulfilled all legal requirements for conducting
DIYbio activity before issuing a patent.328 This potential enforcement
mechanism seems less promising, however, as it would reach only
those persons who go forward with the patenting process. Relatively
few DIY biologists are likely to seek patents, given the movement’s
ethos of open access and its general hostility to intellectual property
regimes.329 Would-be bioterrorists, amateurs who simply want to
tinker, and open source enthusiasts would be indifferent to the threat
of unpatentability.
Government also could adopt approaches that incorporate
financial incentives, for example, by funding DIYbio labs. Subsidies
are frequently used to incentivize activities that provide public
benefits,330 and conditions placed on government funding recipients
historically have played an important role in research oversight.
Government-sponsored DIYbio labs could provide data to the
government and enable oversight, while at the same time encouraging
innovative experimentation.331 Moreover, inexpensive access to such
labs may help keep DIYbio outside of private spaces where unsafe or
unsupervised experiments may be more likely.332 Political support for
government-funded DIYbio labs, however, may be hard to come by if
public benefits are not obvious.333 Furthermore, DIYbio practitioners,
sensitive to threats to freedom of inquiry, may view any government

328. Kellogg, supra note 9, at 26 (“In such a case, any patent applicant would need to
prove he or she had gone through biosafety training, has insurance, or hadn’t spent time in
prison.”).
329. See supra notes 292–96 and accompanying text.
330. See Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 73, at 950–51 (explaining how various
municipalities subsidize the “sharing economy” through urban bike-shares, direct
payments to “sharing firms” like Uber, and other subsidies); see also ORSI ET AL., supra
note 229, at 9–37 (describing steps that municipalities can take to promote sharing
activities, including designated parking for car sharing and support for housing and worker
cooperatives).
331. See GRUSHKIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 22 (advocating for publicly funded
community labs to drive innovation in DIYbio and improve enforcement capabilities).
332. See Holloway, supra note 28, at 28 (“Providing formal laboratory space . . . helps
keep DIYbio outside of garages and suburban homes while also providing the education
needed to ensure that appropriate laboratory procedures—and any future regulations—
are followed.”); see also Landrain et al., supra note 5, at 124 (explaining how public
community labs would improve safety and potential enforcement of regulations).
333. Cf. Chad Orzel, The Most Important Science to Fund Is the Hardest to Explain,
FORBES (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chadorzel/2017/03/23/the-mostimportant-science-to-fund-is-the-hardest-to-explain/#b8acd0f27179 [https://perma.cc/FP6U
-D3AC] (describing historical criticism of scientific research funding that is difficult to
understand as wasteful).
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involvement as a threat to co-opt their movement.334 Persons seeking
to avoid government oversight through these labs might turn to
crowdfunding or other forms of private sponsorship.335 In addition,
the declining costs of DIYbio experimentation will allow some to
fund their own labs rather than rely on government facilities.
Finally, it may eventually be possible to incorporate controls
through code. DIY biologists someday could find it easier to work
with standardized biological systems rather than to start projects from
scratch.336 If so, security features might be incorporated into
components used by DIY biologists.337 Similarly, synthetic biologists
might one day design a genetic code containing synthetic nucleic
acids, use of which would prevent genetic interactions with natural
biological systems.338 Other proposed biological containment
mechanisms include the development of organisms dependent on
artificial substances not found in nature.339 The nongovernment
intermediaries who design these mechanisms essentially would
function as gatekeepers or risk managers for DIY biologists’
experiments involving these mechanisms. For now, however, such
mechanisms are best described as speculative, and even if eventually
developed, they would have their own limitations and risks.340
In sum, a registration requirement for DIY biologists would be a
relatively undemanding way for the government to gather
information regarding ongoing activity and determine the need for
additional oversight. Enforcing such a requirement through
community labs and suppliers of genetic materials would build on
existing procedures and enable coverage of most DIY biologists.

334. See Sanchez Barba, supra note 295, at 44–45 (noting hacker resistance to DARPA
funding the expansion of the hackerspace model in United States high schools).
335. See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra 103, at 33–34 (suggesting
potential for crowdfunding or other private investment to place biotechnology activities
outside biosafety oversight mechanisms).
336. See Landrain et al., supra note 5, at 116, 124.
337. Id. at 124.
338. See Markus Schmidt & Víctor de Lorenzo, Synthetic Constructs in/for the
Environment: Managing the Interplay Between Natural and Engineered Biology, 586 FEBS
LETTERS 2199, 2201–03 (2012).
339. Bernadette Bensaude Vincent, Ethical Perspectives on Synthetic Biology, 8
BIOLOGY THEORY 368, 371 (2013); see also Schmidt & de Lorenzo, supra note 338, at
2201–03.
340. See Schmidt & de Lorenzo, supra note 338, at 2204.
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3D Printing
1. A Potential Big Data/Big Government Approach

3D printing is presently subject to little oversight, with the
exception of specific classes of products such as drugs and medical
devices that are subject to regulation regardless of how they are
made.341 Technological advances, however, could enable application
of a Big Data/Big Government approach to 3D-printed products. For
example, researchers have reverse-engineered 3D-printed objects
using sounds emitted by a 3D printer.342 3D-printing activity generates
not only sound but also a thermal profile and electromagnetic
radiation, each of which provides potential clues regarding the object
being printed.343 Surveillance of 3D-printing activity could also rely on
other ways to gather data, as 3D printers typically have cameras and
connections to Wi-Fi networks.344 Users generally conduct at least
some part of their activity online, whether uploading or downloading
digital files, sending files to a maker-hub, or using cloud-based design
software.345 As a result, government has multiple potential entry
points for monitoring and regulating 3D-printing activity.
A Big Data/Big Government approach could involve mere
surveillance or more direct regulation. Direct regulation might focus
on the possession of digital files for manufacturing a dangerous object
or on the possession of the object itself.346 3D printing relies on digital
files that could be tracked—at least in theory. Alternatively, a license
might be required to own a 3D printer or to introduce 3D-printed
objects into commerce.347 Enforcement of such requirements may be

341. See, e.g., Technical Considerations for Additive Manufactured Devices, 81 Fed.
Reg. 28,876, 28,877 (May 10, 2016) (providing the “FDA’s initial thoughts” on how it
would regulate additive manufacturing); Ahmed Zidan, CDER Researchers Explore the
Promise and Potential of 3D Printed Pharmaceuticals, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/NewsEvents/ucm588136.htm
[https://perma.cc/Y5NE-24KV]
(last updated Dec. 11, 2017) (reporting that the FDA has approved approximately 200 3Dprinted devices).
342. Mara Hvistendahl, 3D Printers Vulnerable to Spying, 352 SCI. 132, 132 (2016).
343. Id. at 133.
344. Tracy Hazzard & Tom Hazzard, 3D Print Spying: How Your Printer Poses a
Security Risk, 3D START POINT (Apr. 26, 2016), http://3dstartpoint.com/3d-print-spying/
[https://perma.cc/F4UM-A47P].
345. LUKE HEEMSBERGEN ET AL., MELBOURNE NETWORKED SOC’Y INST., 3D
PRINTING: CIVIC PRACTICES AND REGULATORY CHALLENGES 28 (2016).
346. See CASTRO, supra note 57, at 4.
347. See id. at 5 (characterizing a license requirement as “unlikely and ill-advised
because of . . . its intrusiveness and complexity”); see also HEEMSBERGEN ET AL., supra
note 345, at 38 (discussing licensing proposal).
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difficult, however. In some instances, the targets of data collection or
regulatory efforts may be able to mask information by creating
physical barriers to detection, inserting white noise, or encrypting
digital files.348
Moreover, as is often true of a Big Data/Big Government
approach, government surveillance of 3D printing could be intrusive
or even unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has held that the use of
thermal imaging to measure heat emanating from a home is a search
governed by the Fourth Amendment.349 Inside and outside the home,
however, many unanswered questions remain regarding how the
Fourth Amendment might apply to various technologies.350 Efforts to
regulate possession of information would likely run into First
Amendment objections as well.351
Furthermore, a too-aggressive Big Data/Big Government
approach could backfire by driving activity underground. For
example, as a result of the Department of State’s efforts to restrict
online publication of 3D-printed gun designs, “online groups that had
been openly discussing 3D printing firearms suddenly instituted
private chat rooms, deleted comments on how to meet existing gun
laws or ways to circumvent the law, and began looking to encryption
programs or Dark Web servers sponsored by foreign entities to
escape US jurisdiction.”352 In this instance, heavy-handed regulation
complicated information gathering, decreased users’ willingness to
cooperate with the government, and arguably hastened further
dissemination of 3D-printed gun designs.353
A similar reaction likely would follow stringent government
efforts to limit the distribution or printing of other 3D designs. Like
their counterparts in the DIYbio community, many 3D-printing
enthusiasts subscribe to the hacker ethic and generally oppose
restrictions on their activities.354 “Information wants to be free”—a
348. See Hvistendahl, supra note 342, at 133.
349. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–40 (2001).
350. See Emma Raviv, Homing In: Technology’s Place in Fourth Amendment
Jurisprudence, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 593, 608–16 (2015) (discussing application of
“reasonable expectation of privacy standard” developed in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967), to various technologies). See generally Olivier Sylvain, Failing Expectations:
Fourth Amendment Doctrine in the Era of Total Surveillance, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
485 (2014) (contending that reasonable expectation standard inadequately protects
privacy in context of modern technologies).
351. See CASTRO, supra note 57, at 4.
352. Snow, supra note 1, at 44.
353. See id.
354. See ANGELA DALY, SOCIO-LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE 3D PRINTING REVOLUTION
10–11 (2016).
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notion that underlies digital file sharing practices and permeates the
internet generally—is a popular theme in the world of 3D printing,
heralding for some the democratization of invention and
production.355 Accordingly, 3D-printer users would likely resist
regulation and develop mechanisms to circumvent it.
2. Nongovernmental Intermediaries
Ultimately, reliance on intermediaries is likely to be an
important element of any 3D-printing oversight. Websites or other
entities that host and distribute information could be involved in
policy development, information gathering, standard setting, and
enforcement.356 Indeed, enforcement of any limitations on publishing
or disseminating 3D-printing files would be far easier against these
entities than against individual website users.357 For example,
Thingiverse, a widely used website for sharing digital design files, has
an “acceptable use” policy that forbids users from collecting or
distributing any content that violates a third party’s intellectual
property right or that “promotes illegal activities or contributes to the
creation of weapons, illegal materials or is otherwise
objectionable.”358 While websites might adopt such policies on their
own, government also might mandate that website owners remove
certain types of files under a notice-and-takedown regime similar to
that applied to copyrighted material under the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act.359 Websites beyond the jurisdiction of the United

355. See id. at 8–11; see also R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual
Property and the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 1002–05 (2003).
356. Relatedly, online feedback can help address safety risks related to 3D-printed
products. Osborn, supra note 36, at 596–97. Purchasers of 3D-print files or 3D-printed
items can post reviews or provide feedback to designers. Id. at 597.
357. See CASTRO, supra note 57, at 4. Direct enforcement against 3D-printing end
users may be no more successful than against sharers of music and movie files. See Max
Marder, Leave 3D Printing Alone, HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG (Dec. 06, 2017),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/the-morningside-post/leave-3d-printing-alone_b_4666660.html
[https://perma.cc/NL72-K5V4].
358. MakerBot Terms of Use at ¶ 3.3, MAKERBOT, https://www.makerbot.com/legal
/terms [https://perma.cc/5R92-BKZX] (last updated Oct. 17, 2017). Although labeled as
“MakerBot Terms of Use,” the terms also cover Thingiverse, as MakerBot owns the
website. Id.
359. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, sec. 202,
§ 512(c)(1)(C), 112 Stat. 2860, 2879–80 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)
(2012)); see Desai & Magliocca, supra note 62, at 1718 (proposing enactment of noticeand-takedown regime for websites that host 3D-printing files); CASTRO, supra note 57, at
4; see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012). Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, an
internet service provider can avoid potential liability for copyright infringement by
removing an allegedly infringing item from its servers upon receipt of a proper takedown
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States would likely be able to evade such a mandate, however.360 In
addition, just as peer-to-peer networks for sharing digital music files
undermined copyright enforcement efforts aimed at intermediaries,
users would likely develop mechanisms to circumvent 3D-printing
mandates aimed at website intermediaries.361
Another possible locus of oversight is at the level of 3D-printer
manufacturers. Requiring manufacturers to incorporate mechanisms
to reduce health and safety hazards would be one logical mandate.
But printer manufacturers could be asked to address concerns
regarding counterfeit or dangerous 3D-printed objects as well. For
example, manufacturers might be required to build 3D printers such
that they embed a traceable identifier, such as a pattern of
microbubbles, within all 3D-printed objects they create.362
Alternatively, 3D-printer software could require an identification
code in order to print a file or could block the printing of certain
types of files.363 Such architecture-based efforts to limit the printing
capability of 3D printers, however, may encounter resistance from
users and manufacturers and prove vulnerable to hacking.364 In
addition, the ability of individuals to construct 3D printers on their
own365 could render such oversight ineffectual.
3. Self-Regulation
Finally, self-regulation by 3D-printer users offers another,
perhaps less promising, option for managing risks. Self-regulation
might take the form of restrictions embedded within code or
voluntary guidelines developed and disseminated by companies or
individuals engaged in 3D printing.366 For example, one commentator
has proposed that users follow a norm of taking a screenshot of an
item before printing it in order to promote transparency and

notice. See Lydia Pallas Loren, Deterring Abuse of the Copyright Takedown Regime by
Taking Misrepresentation Claims Seriously, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745, 747 (2011).
360. See CASTRO, supra note 57, at 4.
361. See Osborn, supra note 36, at 616.
362. See Wren, supra note 53; see also CASTRO, supra note 57, at 5.
363. See Osborn, supra note 36, at 603.
364. See Desai & Magliocca, supra note 62, at 1715.
365. Rae Ellen Bichell, For a Few Hundred Bucks, You Can Make Your Own 3-D
Printer, NAT’L PUB. RADIO: ALL TECH CONSIDERED (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.npr.org
/sections/alltechconsidered/2013/11/08/243951594/for-a-few-hundred-bucks-you-can-makeyour-own-3-d-printer [https://perma.cc/9KG8-TEVE (staff-uploaded archive)].
366. See Osborn, supra note 36, at 603 (discussing the “use [of] code for regulatory
purposes in the 3D printing context”); Adam D. Thierer & Adam Marcus, Guns, Limbs,
and Toys: What Future for 3D Printing?, 17 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 805, 829 (2016).
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accountability.367 Nevertheless, in the instances when oversight is
most needed—such as the printing of contraband—users are unlikely
to follow such a norm. Furthermore, community-based oversight,
which offers an external check on undesirable DIYbio activity, is less
likely to be an effective check on undesirable 3D printing. Currently,
most DIYbio activity occurs in community labs, making it subject to
the formal and informal oversight of others. 3D printing, in contrast,
can be undertaken more readily by individuals lacking technical
expertise and within the privacy of one’s home.368 Thus, community–
based oversight and norms are less likely to be successful in such a
context.
Ultimately, a Big Data/Big Government approach to governing
3D printing may be tempting to adopt, but it would encounter
significant practical and constitutional limitations. Websites and other
nongovernmental intermediaries may serve as more effective and
adaptable channels for governing 3D-printing products. In addition,
to address the health and environmental impacts of the 3D-printing
process, regulation of manufacturers may be necessary.
C.

Sharing Economy
1. Experimenting with a Big Data/Big Government Approach

Of the distributed-innovation examples examined in this Article,
the sharing economy is perhaps most susceptible to a Big Data/Big
Government approach. Transactions in the sharing economy leave a
digital trail that cash transactions do not.369 Indeed, data collection
and exchange are at the heart of the digital platforms that undergird
the sharing economy. Though private digital platforms themselves
collect and generate the data, governments could demand—and
increasingly are demanding—the data for their own use.
A brief review of Uber’s data collection practices hints at the
vast quantity and range of information available. First, Uber collects
personal information directly from each user.370 Such information
includes a user’s name, email, phone number, postal address, and
photo.371 Furthermore, Uber collects usage information in a number
of categories: contact information, including names and addresses in a
367. See HEEMSBERGEN ET AL., supra note 345, at 37–38.
368. Osborn, supra note 36, at 616.
369. See JOHAL & ZON, supra note 82, at 19.
370. Privacy Policy, UBER (Sept. 21, 2017), https://privacy.uber.com/policy [perma.cc
/J2XD-RR88].
371. Id.

96 N.C. L. REV. 945 (2018)

2018]

HERDING CATS

1005

user’s address books; information regarding a user’s mobile devices;
IP addresses, app features used, pages viewed, and other information
available on server logs; credit card numbers and other transaction
information; and information regarding a user’s location.372
Controversy has surrounded Uber’s handling of user data, raising
concerns regarding the company’s use of the data, employee access to
the data, data breaches, and user privacy.373 Unsurprisingly,
government officials have taken notice of Uber’s treasure trove of
data. State and local regulators, airport authorities, and law
enforcement officials regularly request information from Uber about
specific trips, trip routes, trip requests, vehicles, riders, and drivers.374
Governments have made liberal use of such data to enact
regulatory schemes tailored to sharing-economy transactions. For
example, local jurisdictions have adopted a variety of approaches to
regulate pre-arranged transportation services.375 Notably, these
regulations largely focus on the transportation network companies
(“TNCs”), such as Uber, that match drivers and passengers. For the
most part, TNCs—and not individual drivers—are responsible for
conducting criminal background checks, providing proof of insurance,
372. See id. Uber previously tracked users’ location even when they were not using the
app, but the company changed its policy to allow users to limit collection of such data to
only when the app is used. See Selena Larson, Uber to Give Users Better Control over
Location Data, CNN TECH (Aug. 29, 2017, 3:40 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/08/29
/technology/uber-location-data/index.html [https://perma.cc/R9E5-5MVH]; Laura Roman,
Uber Now Tracks Passengers’ Locations Even After They’re Dropped Off, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO: ALL TECH CONSIDERED (Dec. 1, 2016, 6:08 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections
/alltechconsidered/2016/12/01/503985473/uber-now-tracks-passengers-locations-even-aftertheyre-dropped-off [https://perma.cc/R6B7-9JWK (staff-uploaded archive)].
373. See Eric Newcomer, Uber Paid Hackers to Delete Stolen Data on 57 Million
People, BLOOMBERG TECH. (Nov. 21, 2017, 4:58 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news
/articles/2017-11-21/uber-concealed-cyberattack-that-exposed-57-million-people-s-data
[https://perma.cc/B433-NE4X]; Anita Ramasastry, Too Much Sharing in the Sharing
Economy? Uber’s Use of Our Passenger Data Highlights the Perils of Data Collection via
Geolocation, JUSTIA: VERDICT (Feb. 10, 2015), https://verdict.justia.com/2015/02/10/muchsharing-sharing-economy [https://perma.cc/KK75-JD2C]; Roman, supra note 372. Uber
had previously been commended for steps it took to protect user privacy and provide
greater transparency regarding government requests for information. NATE CARDOZO,
KURT OPSAHL & RAINEY REITMAN, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., WHO HAS YOUR
BACK?: PROTECTING YOUR DATA FROM GOVERNMENT REQUESTS 23–24 (6th ed. 2016)
https://www.eff.org/files/2016/05/04/who-has-your-back-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/G3WZAUL5].
374. Transparency Report, UBER (Apr. 14, 2017), https://transparencyreport.uber.com/
[https://perma.cc/V4EH-QJJ8] (listing regulators and law enforcement from various
jurisdictions who required Uber to give them information from July to December 2016).
375. See K. Casey Strong, When Apps Pollute: Regulating Transportation Network
Companies to Maximize Environmental Benefits, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 1049, 1078–87
(2015) (discussing different regulatory approaches applied to transportation network
companies in Colorado, California, and Seattle, Washington).
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and meeting other regulatory requirements.376 Short-term residential
rentals have also attracted the regulatory attention of local
governments, which in some cases have created new oversight
schemes tailored to these markets.377 These schemes tend to impose
regulatory requirements on both the hosts offering the rental and the
web platforms through which rentals are arranged.378
The development of regulatory regimes tailored to specific
sharing-economy activities suggests an increasingly adaptive and
experimental approach to government regulation. Other tools
reflecting such an approach include: temporary waivers or exemptions
from regulation, which allow economic activity to continue while
regulators gather information and gain experience; sunset or
regulatory review provisions, which require regulators to revisit
standards previously adopted; and pilot programs, which test a
regulatory approach on a small scale prior to broader
implementation.379 The devolution of policy questions to local
governments, which has allowed municipalities to adopt a variety of
regulatory responses to Airbnb and Uber, itself demonstrates an
experimental approach to governance that exemplifies Justice
Brandeis’s laboratories of democracy.380
A Big Data/Big Government approach could be applied not only
to sharing-economy activities but also to the innovation process

376. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 5433 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.
laws) (describing the insurance requirements for TNCs operating in California); Decision
Adopting Rules and Regulations to Protect Public Safety While Allowing New Entrants to
the Transportation Industry at 3, Decision No. 13-09-045, Rulemaking No. 12-12-011 (Cal.
Pub. Utils. Comm’n Sept. 19, 2013), 2013 WL 10230598, at *2 (requiring, among other
things, that TNCs obtain a license from the California Public Utilities Commission,
conduct criminal background checks on their drivers, and maintain commercial liability
insurance policies).
377. See Miller, supra note 70, at 184–95 (describing efforts to regulate short-term
residential rental market). Some jurisdictions have attempted to enforce ordinances
prohibiting or limiting such rentals. See Lobel, supra note 65, at 128–29.
378. See, e.g., S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 41A.5(g) (2018, Am. Legal Pub. Corp.,
through Mar. 8, 2018).
379. See JOHAL & ZON, supra note 82, at 22, 24; Sofia Ranchordás, InnovationFriendly Regulation: The Sunset of Regulation, the Sunrise of Innovation, 55 JURIMETRICS
201, 218–19 (2015). Along the same lines are proposals that government agencies organize
regulatory experiments involving new risky technologies. Matthew T. Wansley, Regulation
of Emerging Risks, 69 VAND. L. REV. 401, 404 (2016); see also Ranchordás, supra, at 207,
220–22.
380. See Lobel, supra note 65, at 161; see also New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S.
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
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itself—i.e., the continuing invention of new digital marketplaces.381
The dynamic nature of innovation poses particular challenges for
government in terms of identifying trends, determining regulatory
needs, and designing suitable responses. Prohibitions or restrictions
targeting a particular platform might be readily circumvented by the
creation of alternative platforms offering a similar service.382
Nonetheless, the digital nature of these marketplaces renders them
traceable, and the efforts of these marketplaces to attract users will
likely make them visible to regulators as well.
2. A Governance Role for Nongovernmental Intermediaries
Governance of the shared economy is not limited to the Big
Data/Big Government approach. Airbnb, Uber, TaskRabbit, and
other platform companies are emerging as key regulatory
intermediaries.383 In the sharing economy, platform companies offer
“access to the software, the matching algorithms, and a digital system
of reputation and trust between their users.”384 These companies can
react more quickly than public regulators to new developments in the
sharing economy.385 Moreover, because of the market power that
various platforms have gained through their extensive networks,386
platform companies often have substantial authority and the ability to
set and enforce standards.387
As already noted, government may impose mandates on
platforms in order to regulate distributed-innovation activity
indirectly.388 Yet platform companies may exercise a governance
function even in the absence of public mandates. Platform companies
are private, economically-motivated actors whose self-interests may
prompt them to address certain aspects of market failures.389 In
addition, platform companies may be subject to pressure from angel

381. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
382. See Miller, supra note 70, at 168 (noting the failed efforts to regulate the illegal
music-sharing business by shutting down Napster).
383. See Cohen & Sundararajan, supra note 261, at 116–17 (“[P]latforms should not be
viewed as entities to be regulated but rather as actors that are a key part of the regulatory
framework . . . .”); see also BALARAM, supra note 64, at 37–38.
384. Lobel, supra note 65, at 100.
385. See Zale, supra note 74, at 1005–06.
386. See BALARAM, supra note 64, at 18–19.
387. See Cohen & Sundararajan, supra note 261, at 130.
388. See supra text accompanying notes 249–52.
389. See Cohen & Sundararajan, supra note 261, at 121.
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investors and venture capitalists to adhere to specific rules or
requirements as a condition of continued funding.390
Platform companies commonly reduce information asymmetries
through online feedback systems, background checks, and screening
of service providers.391 They often address risks to users by offering
money-back guarantees or liability insurance coverage.392 And leery
of public opposition or government regulation, platform companies
may adopt measures to diminish the negative externalities associated
with their users’ activities. TaskRabbit has instituted a sitewide
minimum wage,393 for example, and Airbnb has created a hotline on
its website for neighbors of Airbnb hosts.394
Reputations established through online feedback are a
particularly prominent mechanism for governance in the sharing
economy. Reputation systems improve market functioning by
increasing the quality and quantity of information on which market
participants base their decisions.395 Providers are unlikely to attract
business if their ratings are adverse, and users who develop a negative
reputation may be excluded from subsequent transactions. Ratings
systems provide information in a “real-time and dynamic” manner
and “functionally substitute personal trust and regulated
standards.”396 These systems, however, are not perfect. They can be
subject to bias, manipulation, and falsification, and feedback
mechanisms may magnify the effect of a few initial reviews, whether
accurate or not.397
390. See generally Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel
Investors, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1405 (2008) (discussing roles and behaviors of angel investors
and venture capitalists and their non-financial motivations for investing).
391. See Cohen & Sundararajan, supra note 261, at 120–22; Lobel, supra note 65, at
147–48, 151–55.
392. FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE “SHARING” ECONOMY: ISSUES FACING PLATFORMS
PARTICIPANTS & REGULATORS 6 (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents
/reports/sharing-economy-issues-facing-platforms-participants-regulators-federal-tradecommission-staff/p151200_ftc_staff_report_on_the_sharing_economy.pdf [https://perma.cc
/HNV5-K36M].
393. JOHAL & ZON, supra note 82, at 20.
394. Airbnb and Your Neighborhood, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/neighbors
[https://perma.cc/TW2D-V8WV].
395. See Eric Goldman, Regulating Reputation, in THE REPUTATION SOCIETY: HOW
ONLINE OPINIONS ARE RESHAPING THE OFFLINE WORLD 51, 53 (Hassan Masum &
Mark Tovey eds., 2012).
396. Lobel, supra note 65, at 153.
397. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 392, at 5–6; see Kendall L. Short, Buy My Vote:
Online Reviews for Sale, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 441, 443–44 (2013); see also Cannon
& Chung, supra note 237, at 38–40. Some studies have found, for example, evidence of
racial discrimination in ratings and rental practices on Airbnb. See BALARAM, supra note
64, at 45–46 (discussing studies finding that minorities are less likely to be accepted as
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Notwithstanding their power and their central role in the sharing
economy, platform companies cannot be expected to perform all
desired governance functions. Platforms are ultimately private
economic entities that may not adequately consider the interests of
the public or of other stakeholders.398 In some contexts, other
nongovernmental entities—such as homeowners associations in the
instance of short-term rentals, or associations of drivers in the case of
Uber—may step in to represent other interests.399
Governance through platform companies may lack transparency,
whether such governance involves government regulation or selfregulation.400 In either case, the precise nature of a regulation, as well
its source, may be obscured from users and the public. Users may not
even be aware that their behavior is being regulated thanks to the
subtlety with which a platform’s software operates—whether in the
form of matching algorithms, filters, or other features.401 Lack of
accountability is also a concern, as governance by platform companies
may not allow for public participation or user input, and their
decisions are not subject to democratic processes or judicial review.402
3. Self-Regulation
Online reputation systems, though usually mediated by platform
companies, rely on the input of platform users.403 These systems thus
constitute a form of self-regulation, particularly when platforms make
users’ feedback directly available to other users and potential users.
Users’ cumulative feedback—and even the potential to receive a

guests and are also less likely to earn the same income as an Airbnb host compared to a
white person).
398. See Cohen & Sundararajan, supra note 261, at 131; see also Zale, supra note 74, at
1008–10 (noting resistance of some platform companies to participating in co-regulation).
399. See Cohen & Sundararajan, supra note 261, at 130–31 (arguing that homeowners
associations are well suited to “play a key role in the regulation of local externalities” that
Airbnb creates); Davey Alba, NYC Uber Drivers Are Organizing—Just Don’t Call It a
Union, WIRED (May 10, 2016), http://www.wired.com/2016/05/nyc-uber-driversorganizing-just-dont-call-union/ [https://perma.cc/67UA-2XZR].
400. Cf. Lessig, supra note 219, at 541 (explaining that the law’s regulation of code
undermines transparency by enabling government regulation without revealing the
government’s role).
401. See Jack M. Balkin, Information Power: The Information Society from an
Antihumanist Perspective, in THE GLOBAL FLOW OF INFORMATION: LEGAL, SOCIAL,
AND CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 232, 238–40 (Ramesh Subramanian & Eddan Katz eds.,
2016); Lessig, supra note 219, at 509 (“The code, or the software and hardware that make
cyberspace the way it is, constitutes a set of constraints on how one can behave.”).
402. See Cohen & Sundararajan, supra note 261, at 131; Zale, supra note 74, at 998.
403. Goldman, supra note 395, at 52 (distinguishing unmediated and mediated
reputation systems and providing examples of mediated systems).
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negative review—can serve as incentives for good behavior,
particularly with respect to repeat players.404
Indeed, the ongoing development of decentralized online
marketplaces offers the prospect of peer-to-peer transactions
occurring without a digital platform company serving as an
intermediary.405 These marketplaces are built upon blockchain
technology, which relies on “a shared, trusted, public ledger that
everyone can inspect, but which no single user controls” to keep track
of transactions without a central oversight institution.406 A sharing
economy without middlemen would lack one of the more effective
levers for government oversight and raise new challenges for
governance.407 Such a system would have a self-regulatory aspect in
that users and coders would set the rules and help ensure the integrity
of transactions.408 It is not clear, however, that broader societal
interests would be protected.409 Government involvement in creating
the computer code that underlies decentralized online marketplaces
could provide a means of exerting influence and protecting the public
interest.410
The sharing economy is already witnessing a combination of
governance approaches that incorporate Big Data/Big Government,
nongovernmental intermediaries, and self-regulation. Current
approaches must continue to evolve in order to keep up with new
developments and concerns.

404. See Koopman et al., supra note 71, at 541–43.
405. See BALARAM, supra note 64, at 29, 37–38 (discussing the growing number of cooperatives using blockchain technology to create “genuinely peer-to-peer market[s]”).
406. The Trust Machine: The Promise of the Blockchain, ECONOMIST (Oct. 31, 2015),
https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21677198-technology-behind-bitcoin-could-transform
-how-economy-works-trust-machine [https://perma.cc/T8FA-3MVR (dark archive)].
407. See, e.g., BALARAM, supra note 64, at 29–30; U.K. GOV’T OFFICE FOR SCI.,
DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY: BEYOND BLOCK CHAIN 44 (2015),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/492972/gs
-16-1-distributed-ledger-technology.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Z4G-UKDH] (noting that
attempts to regulate Bitcoin have focused on regulating businesses that deal with Bitcoin
rather than Bitcoin itself because “no single entity is in control of the system”).
408. See, e.g., U.K. GOV’T OFFICE FOR SCI., supra note 407, at 43 (explaining that
Bitcoin software can be changed only by core developers, who are “constrained by an
informal self-imposed charter” requiring “broad consensus” for significant changes, and
only if changes are adopted by a majority of Bitcoin miners).
409. Cf. BALARAM, supra note 64, at 38 (suggesting “shared regulation” by “a more
comprehensive range of stakeholders”).
410. See U.K. GOV’T OFFICE FOR SCI., supra note 407, at 44–45.
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CONCLUSION
Characterized by new activities occurring outside established
organizational arrangements, distributed innovation challenges
traditional structures of management and authority. Distributed
innovation fits poorly within existing legal categories, avoids ready
detection, and metamorphoses into new forms. Experience in
governing the conduct of individuals and small pollution sources,
however, suggests possible means to influence distributed innovation
in pursuit of public goals. Recognizing the challenge as one of
governance, and not simply regulation, enables the recruitment of
businesses, nonprofit organizations, and innovators themselves for
managing the risks.
Given the various forms and contexts in which distributed
innovation arises, there is no one-size-fits-all solution to the
challenges it presents. Nor is any single governance tool likely to
suffice within a particular context. The Big Data/Big Government
approach is a tempting response to fears of catastrophic harm or
misuse. Yet it cannot eliminate all risk, and it often comes at a high
cost to the public fisc and to autonomy and privacy interests.
Nongovernmental intermediaries can be an effective locus for
government regulation, and in some instances they may develop their
own measures to govern distributed innovators directly. Yet
intermediaries may fail to account for relevant public concerns, and
the legitimacy of their actions are open to question. Self-regulation
offers a promising response to the practical difficulties distributed
innovation poses for conventional regulation. At the same time,
private interests are especially likely to predominate, and lack of
legitimacy is of particular concern. Each of these approaches,
however imperfect, may provide a valuable contribution to managing
the risks of distributed innovation when used in concert with the
others. Because distributed innovation takes different forms and is
constantly adapting, the approaches utilized in its governance must
also be flexible and adaptive. Governance of distributed innovation, it
turns out, must be both distributed and innovative.
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